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INTRODUCTION
Ready or not, securities crowdfunding is about to go live.1
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 20122
amended federal securities law to allow entrepreneurs to sell
up to $1 million in unregistered securities to the public over the
Internet.3 No longer will an entrepreneur be stymied by a lack
1. The federal statute authorizing crowdfunding was signed into law by
President Obama in April 2012 and directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to issue final regulations by the end of that year.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat.
306, 320 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). The SEC adopted final rules on
crowdfunding in October 2015. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC
Adopts Rules To Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-249.html. The new crowdfunding rules are set to become effective 180 days after publication in the Federal Register, so the first
crowdfunding offerings will likely commence in 2016. JD Alois, Final Crowdfunding Rules Under Title III of the JOBS Act of 2012, CROWDFUND INSIDER
(Oct. 31, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/10/ 76637final-crowdfunding-rules-under-title-iii-of-the-jobs-act-of-2012/.
2. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 126 Stat. at 306 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o (2012)).
3. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1457, 1458 & n.2 (2013).
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of personal wealth or connections (or proximity to Silicon Valley). Once crowdfunding4 begins, anybody with a startup5 will
be able to go online and offer a piece of the action to the American people.6 And the community of investors—coined here as
―digital shareholders‖7—will be inclusive and diverse as well.
Through crowdfunding, people of modest means will for the
first time be legally authorized to invest in startups that are
currently offered exclusively to wealthy ―accredited‖ investors.8
This is a compelling vision, one endorsed by a bipartisan
Congress and echoed by a diverse group of states as well as foreign countries.9 ―For the first time,‖ said President Obama
when he signed the JOBS Act, ―ordinary Americans will be able
to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.‖10
But can crowdfunding really live up to this sort of rhetoric?
4. The term ―crowdfunding‖ has a variety of uses in the field of securities
law. In this Article it is used to refer to financing a business, especially a
startup, pursuant to Title III of the federal JOBS Act of 2012 or analogous legislation. See id. at 1458.
5. Crowdfunding is not legally limited to startup companies; other small
businesses can avail themselves as well. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural
Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 283, 293 (2013) (discussing crowdfunding as a way for farms to raise capital). The thrust of the legislation, however,
is to assist startups, as is apparent from the fact that JOBS stands for
―Jumpstart Our Business Startups.‖
6. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act
Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing (―Because of this bill, start-ups
and small business will now have access to a big, new pool of potential investors—namely, the American people.‖).
7. The term ―digital shareholder‖ is new and meant to refer to any
crowdfunding investor, not just those who are ―shareholders‖ in the literal
sense of holding common stock. A person who buys a bond or any other crowdfunded security is a digital shareholder as the term is coined here.
8. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013) (explaining how the average investor is limited
to buying public securities while the wealthy accredited investor also has access to private markets).
9. As of February 2015, thirteen states and thirty countries had enacted
crowdfunding regimes. Steven Davidoff Solomon, S.E.C.’s Delay on Rules for
Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at B11; EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING NETWORK, ECN REVIEW OF CROWDFUNDING REGULATION
2014
(Dec.
2014),
http://www.eurocrowd.org/2014/12/ecn-review
-crowdfunding-regulation-2014; see also Robert H. Steinhoff, The Next British
Invasion Is Securities Crowdfunding: How Issuing Non-Registered Securities
Through the Crowd Can Succeed in the United States, 86 U. COLO. L. REV.
661, 690–713 (2015) (describing crowdfunding in the United Kingdom).
10. Press Release, White House, supra note 6; accord 2015 Colo. Sess.
Laws 279–80 (declaring that crowdfunding will ―democratize venture capital
formation‖).
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Many legal scholars think crowdfunding will fail and have
made a sport of tallying reasons why: fraud,11 costs,12 dilution,13 adverse selection,14 opportunism,15 and more.16
This Article is different. Rather than hurling another
stone, this Article charts a positive course for crowdfunding to
succeed; a course based on first principles of entrepreneurial
finance. As Professor Ronald Gilson and others have established, there are three fundamental problems that all systems
of startup finance must confront and overcome: (1) Uncertainty:
it is impossible to predict how a startup will perform; (2) Information asymmetry: entrepreneurs inevitably know much more
than investors about their business; (3) Agency costs: entrepreneurs will be tempted to shirk and engage in self-dealing.17
This well-known ―trio of problems‖ applies directly to crowdfunding, where they will present themselves in ―extreme form‖
due to the very early stage of the startups involved.18
Thus the important question this Article addresses is
11. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed
at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV.
879, 935 (2011) (expressing concern over ―the capacity for fraud in crowdfunding‖); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social
Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption
Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1769
(2012) (discussing crowdfunding and concluding ―that social media technologies increase . . . the potential for fraud‖).
12. See, e.g., Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 284–85 (2014); Robert B. Thompson &
Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1605 (2013).
13. See, e.g., John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd,
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 616 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for
Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 601–02 (2015); see also Michael B. Dorff, The
Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 513 (2014); Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J. MARSHALL J.
INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 253, 266–69 (2013).
15. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 106–07.
16. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding
and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 251–58 (claiming that
―[e]quity [c]rowdfunding [i]s [d]oomed‖ for a half-dozen independent reasons).
17. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003); see Robert P.
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 41 n.9 (2006) (―This model . . . can be found
in virtually any academic discussion . . . .‖).
18. Gilson, supra note 17; see Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 573–76 (applying
Gilson‘s framework to crowdfunding).
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whether crowdfunding can respond to these three fundamental
problems in an efficient way. Indeed, the various academic critiques can generally be categorized as claims that one or another of the trio of problems will prove intractable for crowdfunding. For example, those who predict adverse selection are
worried about information asymmetry;19 those who predict
fraud are concerned about agency costs.20 Rather than taking
them one at a time, this Article systematically examines the
three fundamental challenges of entrepreneurial finance in the
context of crowdfunding.
Part I provides a primer on crowdfunding, describing the
authorizing legislation and its underlying policies. Part II then
introduces the trio of problems, namely uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs, and predicts how they
will reveal themselves in crowdfunding, setting the stage for
the heart of the Article in Parts III and IV.
Part III takes a close look at the way in which three traditional forms of entrepreneurial finance—venture capital (VC),
angel investing, and public companies—have addressed the trio
of problems. Can any of the tools honed and perfected over the
years in these three contexts be applied to crowdfunding? Unfortunately, the mechanisms used in these traditional forms of
entrepreneurial finance will not translate well to crowdfunding.
While a handful appear to hold some relevance for crowdfunding, none of the strongest methods used by VCs, angels, or public shareholders to address the trio of problems hold much
promise for crowdfunding. For example, VCs and angel investors participate actively in their portfolio companies, in part to
monitor management, but this is not possible for the crowd.
Similarly, public shareholders depend on mandatory disclosure,
but the signature move of crowdfunding is to exempt these securities from the usual disclosure requirements. In short, merely emulating what has worked in the past will likely prove insufficient for crowdfunding to succeed. New ideas are needed.
The primary contribution of this Article thus comes in Part
IV, which describes a set of five novel methods for addressing
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the
crowdfunding context. These novel mechanisms are not taken
from traditional sources but rather are designed specifically for
crowdfunding‘s distinctive digital context.
First, crowdfunding can use the wisdom of the crowd to
19. See Ibrahim, supra note 14 (discussing information asymmetry).
20. See infra Part II.C (discussing examples of fraud).
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distinguish between promising and poor investments.21 Second,
digital shareholders can work together to crowdsource investment analysis on the Internet.22 Third, the promoters and
management of a crowdfunding company will have their online
reputation at stake, giving them an incentive to act fairly and
properly.23 Fourth, crowdfunding companies can use securitiesbased compensation, whereby management would be paid in
the security being offered to the crowd.24 Fifth, digital monitoring mechanisms can effectively address agency costs in crowdfunding companies at low cost.25 Collectively these solutions
provide a sound foundation for crowdfunding to function and
even thrive.
This Article makes at least three novel contributions to the
literature: First, it systematically analyzes the three fundamental problems of finance in the context of crowdfunding.26
Second, it examines the solutions employed in the analogous
contexts of VC, angel investing, and public companies, and determines their relevance for crowdfunding.27 Third, and most
importantly, it introduces a novel set of ―digital‖ methods to
address the three challenges that are well-suited to crowdfunding‘s institutional context.28
I. INTRODUCTION TO CROWDFUNDING
The idea of allowing startups and small businesses to use
the Internet to raise capital originated in the 1990s,29 but it
was not until the 2010s that securities crowdfunding was finally authorized by federal and state legislation.30 This Part introduces the concept of securities crowdfunding and the recent legal reforms that brought it into being. It also describes the
compelling inclusive vision that crowdfunding offers to both entrepreneurs and investors.
21. Infra Part IV.A.
22. Infra Part IV.B.
23. Infra Part IV.C.
24. Infra Part IV.D.
25. Infra Part IV.E.
26. Infra Part II.
27. Infra Part III.
28. Infra Part IV.
29. E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business
Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57 (1998).
30. See Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 587 (―Twelve states have evidently
tired of waiting for the SEC to act on Title III and have implemented their
own intrastate Title III-like exemptions.‖).
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A. CROWDFUNDING SECURITIES
Securities crowdfunding is a new idea that builds off of the
earlier concept of crowdsourcing.31 Crowdsourcing is where the
public—the ―crowd‖—is invited to contribute to an online project without compensation.32 Wikipedia is a famous example of
an Internet-based encyclopedia, in which many workers, each
adding just a bit, collectively created an amazing resource.33
Crowdfunding differs from crowdsourcing in that the crowd is
asked to contribute money rather than labor.34 To date, most
crowdfunding projects have been in the form of ―reward‖ crowdfunding where, in return for capital, the funding participants
receive the fruits of the project, such as a book, CD, or video
game.35 Websites such as Kickstarter have been doing reward
crowdfunding for the past five years, during which time it has
quickly grown into a $2 billion market.36
Securities crowdfunding also will take place on the Internet but will take the concept one step further. Funding participants will receive a security, such as a share of stock, a bond, or
any other investment contract.37 For example, in exchange for
an investment of $100, each investor might receive a share in a
rock band‘s profits from their upcoming tour, which is itself financed through these investments. Until the passage of recent
federal legislation as discussed immediately below, however,
crowdfunding securities in this way would violate the Securities Act of 1933 as an unregistered public offering.38 The law
allows a person to solicit investments from the public if all that
is promised is a CD or concert tickets, as in the case of reward
crowdfunding.39 But in order to sell securities to the public, the
31. See generally DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING 2–4 (2013) (offering a formal definition of crowdsourcing); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459–77
(defining securities crowdfunding and providing background information).
32. See
Crowdsourcing,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Crowdsourcing (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); infra Part IV.B. See generally
BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 12–13 (describing the internet‘s ability to foster
dialogue).
33. See Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
34. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459.
35. See id. at 1459–60.
36. See Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last
visited Nov. 2, 2015) (listing $2 billion pledged on Kickstarter since inception).
37. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459–60.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
39. Purchasing a CD or concert tickets from a reward crowdfunding website would not qualify as a ―security‖ under the Securities Act, and was al-
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Securities Act generally mandates that you first register the
securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), otherwise the securities can be cancelled and the money
returned.40 That is, unless the offering is made under an ―exemption‖ found in the Securities Act.
―Exempt‖ offerings are exactly what they sound like; offerings of securities without prior registration. Two important and
long-standing exemptions are the private placement exemption,
where one offers securities to an exclusive group of family and
friends,41 and the accredited investor exemption, where one
sells securities solely to wealthy people (―accredited‖ investors).42 Title III of the federal JOBS Act (also known as the
CROWDFUND Act) added a new exemption for crowdfunded
securities to this list,43 pending the promulgation of regulations
by the SEC.44 In addition to that federal regime, a diverse
group of states have recently used the existing intrastate exemption to create an in-state crowdfunding regime.45
These new laws authorize the crowdfunding of any type of
security, including common stock, preferred stock, bonds, or
any sort of ―investment contract.‖46 This author has opined that
debt may be an attractive type of security to crowdfund,47 but
many others expect that equity will play the primary role, as it
has in the traditional contexts of VCs, angels, and public companies.48
lowed before the recent legislative changes. Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding
and an Innovator’s Access to Capital, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 890 (2014).
40. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77t, 77h-1.
41. Id. § 77d(a)(2).
42. Id. § 77d(a)(5). To qualify as an accredited investor, one must generally possess a net worth that exceeds $1,000,000 (excluding one‘s primary residence) or an annual income that exceeds $200,000 individually or $300,000
jointly for each of the past two years. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2015).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). The CROWDFUND Act is Title III of the broader ―JOBS Act,‖ which entered into law in April 2012. Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
44. See supra note 1.
45. See supra note 30.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); see S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–
99 (1946) (defining ―investment contract‖).
47. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1488–89.
48. See, e.g., Parsont, supra note 12, at 289–90 (predicting the growth of
―equity-based sites‖). This Article addresses itself to the crowdfunding of any
and all types of securities. However, because of the overriding importance of
equity (including securities convertible to equity) to the traditional modes of
entrepreneurial finance—VCs, angels and public companies—this Article discusses, where appropriate, concepts that are relevant only to equity securities.
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The federal CROWDFUND Act includes a number of limitations on the crowdfunding of securities,49 including the following: Companies may not raise more than $1 million annually via crowdfunding.50 Investors may only invest a maximum of
5% of their annual income or net worth in all crowdfunded securities each year.51 Crowdfunding transactions must be conducted through an intermediary broker dealer or ―funding portal.‖52 Issuers may not advertise to the public directly.53
Investors who have pledged to invest may cancel their commitment before the deal closes.54
The emphasis of the statute (and this Article) is on startup
companies, although this is not a strict requirement.55 Almost
any corporation or other business organized under state law
will be authorized to issue securities through crowdfunding.
The exceptions are publicly traded companies, investment companies, and foreign companies, all of which are prohibited from
employing the crowdfunding exemption.56
Crowdfunding issuers must provide some basic disclosures
to the public, including (a) the name, address, and website of
the company; (b) the names of directors, officers, and substantial investors; (c) a description of the business and the anticipated business plan; and (d) a description of the issuer‘s financial condition.57 Issuers must also provide a description of the
purpose and intended use of the proceeds, the target offering
See, e.g., infra Part III.C.4 (discussing shareholder derivative actions); infra
Part III.C.7 (discussing appraisal and Weinberger). A discussion specific to
debt-based crowdfunding is beyond the scope of the present Article but would
appear to be a worthy subject of future work.
49. For a more complete discussion, see Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1460–
66.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A).
51. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i). Wealthy investors can invest up to 10%. Id.
§ 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
52. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C).
53. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
54. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
55. See supra note 4.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(f).
57. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1). The disclosure requirements concerning the financial
condition of the issuer vary depending on the size of the offering. Offerings
under $100,000 must provide income tax returns for the last fiscal year and
unaudited financial statements certified as accurate by the principle executive
officer. For offerings over $100,000 and up to $500,000, financial statements
reviewed by an independent public accountant are required. For offerings
greater than $500,000, audited financial statements are required. Id. § 77d1(b)(1)(D)(i)–(iii).
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amount, the price of the securities to be offered, and a description of the ownership and capital structure of the issuer.58 Following a crowdfunding round, an issuer must annually file with
the SEC, and make available to investors, financial statements
and a report on the results of operations.59
Issuers are prohibited from advertising the offering themselves, and any solicitation of the offering must go through the
registered funding portal.60 Crowdfunded securities cannot be
transferred or sold by investors for one year after the date of
purchase, unless being transferred to the issuer, as part of an
offering registered by the SEC, or to an accredited investor or
family member.61 The CROWDFUND Act authorizes civil actions for fraud against issuers, directors, and officers.62 Finally,
the Act expressly prohibits the several states from adding additional reporting requirements for crowdfunded securities.63
The SEC recently promulgated ―Regulation Crowdfunding,‖ as commanded by the CROWDFUND Act.64 Once the
SEC‘s final regulations go into effect in 2016, interstate crowdfunding will commence.65
On the state level, more than a dozen have enacted legislation or administrative rules authorizing securities crowdfunding within their borders,66 pursuant to the venerable intrastate
exemption.67 This is a diverse group of states, both geographically and politically, including Colorado,68 Georgia,69 Massachusetts,70 Michigan,71 Tennessee72 and Texas.73 All of these in58. Issuers must also announce the deadline to reach their target
amounts and provide regular updates regarding their progress toward meeting
their target amounts. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E)–(H). If the issuer fails to reach the
goal, the whole transaction is cancelled. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
59. Id. § 77d-1(b)(4).
60. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
61. Id. § 77d-1(e).
62. Id. § 77d-1(c)(1)–(3).
63. Id. § 77r(a)(1), (b)(4)(C).
64. See supra note 1.
65. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 1.
66. Thirteen states had enacted intrastate crowdfunding rules as of November 2014. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 9.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308.5 (2015).
69. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2012).
70. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015).
71. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2102a (2015).
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A) (2014).
73. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (2014).
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trastate schemes bear a close resemblance to the federal
CROWDFUND Act, albeit with small changes here and there.
For instance, several states increased the maximum amount
issuers can raise to $2 million, rather than $1 million as in the
federal act.74 These modest changes do not affect the basic
character of crowdfunding securities, and they need not be
elaborated further.
The important point for present purposes is that the rapid
adoption of crowdfunding legislation across a wide variety of
states indicates a high level of enthusiasm for this new method
of financing startups. Indeed, many of these intrastate crowdfunding schemes were enacted as a direct result of frustration
with the SEC‘s delay in implementing the CROWDFUND
Act.75 These various state legislatures want crowdfunding to
begin as soon as possible for their constituencies, which is a
strong vote of support for the vision of crowdfunding, the subject of the next Section.
B. THE VISION OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding offers a compelling and inclusive vision that
promises benefits for investors, entrepreneurs, and the economy as a whole. This is why the federal JOBS Act passed with a
large bipartisan majority and why so many states have enacted
intrastate crowdfunding regimes of their own.
Crowdfunding has two primary goals, one relating to entrepreneurs and one relating to investors. First, crowdfunding
can empower entrepreneurs from coast to coast to use social
networks and the Internet to obtain business capital at a reasonable cost. Second, crowdfunding can democratize the market
for financing speculative companies by inviting ordinary people—―digital shareholders‖—to make investments that are currently offered solely to accredited (wealthy) investors.
1. Startup Nation76
There is widespread agreement that entrepreneurship is
vital to innovation, economic growth, and employment in the
74. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(b) (2014).
75. See, e.g., Lee Schafer, State Can’t Wait for Feds on This Kind of Fundraiser, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 12, 2014, at D1; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 9 (―While the Securities and Exchange Commission dawdles, states
are rushing to adopt their own crowdfunding rules.‖).
76. See generally DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION (2009)
(describing Israel‘s startup culture).
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contemporary United States.77 Startups in their first year have
reportedly been responsible for all net job creation in the United States since at least the 1970s, having added about three
million jobs per year, even during recessions.78 Startups are
similarly important for innovation and general economic
growth.79 Although many of these start-ups eventually fold,80
those that survive are often the type of companies that create
satisfying employment opportunities and whose products or
services improve our quality of life.81
Our leaders and policy makers have long understood the
importance of entrepreneurship to a thriving economy and society. President Obama has said that ―entrepreneurialism is the
key to our continued global leadership and the success of our
people.‖82 In the same vein, Congress has twice declared that
―it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal
Government to . . . provide an opportunity for entrepreneurship . . . and the creation and growth of small businesses.‖83
And this has not been empty rhetoric: A portion of all federal
contract dollars are statutorily required to go to small businesses, and the Small Business Administration guarantees
loans for small businesses and provides free counseling and
training to entrepreneurs.84 Similarly, state and local governments expend resources attracting entrepreneurs to their
communities.85 In short, entrepreneurship is in the public in77. E.g., Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17; Ruth Simon & Caelainn Barr, Endangered Species: Young U.S. Entrepreneurs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3–4, 2015, at A1 (―It‘s part
of the vitality of this country to have people starting new businesses and trying new things.‖ (quoting Harvard Business School Professor John Davis)).
78. See TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN
JOB CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION 2–6 (2010).
79. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a) (2012) (declaring a congressional policy of
fostering small business growth).
80. See Steve Lohr, To Create Jobs, Nurture Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2010, at BU3.
81. See id. (―[Small businesses that survive] are prime candidates
to . . . make an outsize contribution to innovation, productivity gains and job
growth . . . .‖).
82. Obama, supra note 77; accord President Barack Obama, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), reprinted in 156 CONG. REC. 790 (2010) (stating that ―most new jobs‖ start in ―companies that begin when an entrepreneur
takes a chance on a dream or a worker decides it‘s time she became her own
boss‖).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a); accord id. § 631(a).
84. See What We Do, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/about
-sba/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
85. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Hoping To Lure Tech Jobs, City Seeks a
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terest and start-up companies are actively encouraged as a
matter of public policy.
Yet even as we recognize that entrepreneurship is so important to a thriving economy and society, we must also
acknowledge that startups commonly have great difficulty obtaining the financing they need.86 This lack of access to financing disproportionately affects certain types of entrepreneurs,
namely those that are ―out-of-the-loop‖ for one reason or another and do not have connections with angel investors or other
wealthy financiers.
The traditional first source for entrepreneurial financing is
from the entrepreneur‘s friends and family, as well as their
own personal savings.87 Most people, however, have negligible
personal savings, and the same can be said of their friends, so
it comes down to whether the entrepreneur has a wealthy relative. Moving beyond friends and family, a bank is another potential source of startup capital. In practice, however, banks
are generally hesitant to extend credit to startup companies in
their earliest stages, as the risk is simply too high.88 Many entrepreneurs use credit cards for startup financing,89 but the
high interest rate and relatively low limits mean that other financing sources are needed.
Another option is to obtain capital from professional earlystage investors, such as angel investors or venture capital
funds. But there is tremendous competition for such investPartner To Open a Graduate School of Engineering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010,
at A34 (noting that a desire to spawn ―technology-based start-up companies‖
in New York is behind the city‘s willingness to ―make a significant investment‖
in an engineering school).
86. Simon & Barr, supra note 77 (―Many banks that pulled back on smallbusiness lending during the recession that stretched from December 2007 to
June 2009 have continued to keep lending standards tight.‖); see PERI PAKROO,
THE WOMEN‘S SMALL BUSINESS START-UP KIT 98–99 (2010) (noting banks‘ reluctance to lend to first-time entrepreneurs).
87. PAKROO, supra note 86, at 104; see Angus Loten, For Startups, SelfReliance Comes at a Cost, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B5 (reporting on entrepreneurs‘ increasing reliance on personal finances in recent years).
88. RHONDA ABRAMS, THE OWNER‘S MANUAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 215–
16 (2005); PAKROO, supra note 86; Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, SmallBusiness Lending Stuck in the Slow Lane, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2014, at A1
(―The number of loans for $1 million or less held by banks is down about 14%
to 23.5 million since 2008.‖).
89. ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION 228 (2000) (―[C]redit
cards have become the number one source of financing for small businesses—
supplanting bank loans in the late 1990s.‖); Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough
To Fight, Old Enough To Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal
Credit CARD Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407, 428.
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ments and such investors are interested in certain types of
companies, often in limited geographic areas. Importantly, angels and VCs rely heavily on connections, making it difficult to
get funded in the absence of pre-existing relationships with
such investors or their acquaintances.90
Furthermore, the investing approach and expectations of
VCs can shape the types of companies that get funded. In particular, VCs tend to seek ―scalable‖ businesses, not ordinary
brick-and-mortar companies, even profitable ones.91 While this
may make good sense as a business matter, the effect is that
companies in certain lines of business generally cannot attract
the attention of VCs.
Finally, an entrepreneur could attempt to obtain capital
from the public through an initial public offering (IPO). An
IPO, however, implicates the heart of the Securities Act‘s registration provisions, as well as the many regulations promulgated thereunder. As a result, compliance costs for an IPO can easily run to several million dollars,92 making an IPO economically
infeasible for nearly all early-stage startups.
To sum up, many entrepreneurs have great difficulty financing startup companies. Even worse, this problem appears
to be exacerbated for women and racial minorities.93 The literature in the area shows that most startups founded by AfricanAmericans receive little or no outside financing from any
source, indicating a severe lack of access to startup financing.94
In a similar vein, only about 7% of venture capital funds go to
90. See Loten, supra note 87 (reporting on ―the clubby venture-capital
world,‖ the importance of connections and introductions, and the reality that
finding VC funding is challenging for those who are ―not very well connected‖).
91. Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, Yesterday’s Start-Ups, 2. MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 229 (2013).
92. Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
49 (2015) (reporting that the average regulatory compliance costs total about
$3.5 million for small issuers going public in an IPO).
93. See, e.g., PAKROO, supra note 86, at 96–100 (describing special difficulties of female entrepreneurs); ALICIA ROBB, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ACCESS
TO CAPITAL AMONG YOUNG FIRMS, MINORITY-OWNED FIRMS, WOMEN-OWNED
FIRMS, AND HIGH-TECH FIRMS 2–3 (Apr. 2013).
94. E.g., Paroma Sanyal & Catherine L. Mann, The Financial Structure of
Startup Firms: The Role of Assets, Information, and Entrepreneur Characteristics 15–16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 10-17, Dec. 2010)
(―[S]tartups owned by African-American entrepreneurs have a lower probability of having any type of external finance, especially external equity, and instead finance their firms through personal resources. Based on odds ratios, we
find that such businesses are . . . 98 percent less likely to use external equity,
compared to using internal equity.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
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women-led businesses95 and less than 1% go to businesses
founded by African-Americans.96
Geographical constraints similarly hinder some entrepreneurs, especially because angel investors and venture capitalists tend to stay close to home.97 A startup based in San Francisco has a better chance of being funded than one based in
Toledo simply because there is a much larger community of potential funders in the former. More generally, rural entrepreneurs are at a distinct disadvantage compared with their urban
counterparts.98
Youthful entrepreneurs likewise have exceptional difficulty
finding financing.99 This is especially unfortunate, as young
people are known to challenge orthodox thinking and may be
able to offer fresh, new solutions to vexing problems.100
Crowdfunding offers a new and inclusive way to bring
needed financing to startups all across America, from coast to
coast, in rural areas and urban, to entrepreneurs rich and poor,
young and old, men and women of every race, ethnicity, and religion. Because it is Internet-based and so much less costly
95. Hollie Slade, Why Is It So Hard for Female Entrepreneurs To Get VC
Funding? Could Crowdfunding Be the Answer?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2013, 10:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hollieslade/2013/11/29/why-is-it-so-hard-for
-female-entrepreneurs-to-get-vc-funding-could-crowdfunding-be-the-answer;
see Richard T. Harrison & Colin M. Mason, Does Gender Matter? Women Business Angels and the Supply of Entrepreneurial Finance, 31 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 445, 449–50 (2007) (finding that women comprise a similarly small percentage of angel investors). But cf. Sanyal & Mann, supra note
94, at 16 (―In contrast to other research, women owners do not show a different financial structure from startups where the primary owner is male.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
96. Venture Capital Demographics—87% of VC-Backed Founders Are
White; All-Asian Teams Raise Largest Funding Rounds, CB INSIGHTS
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.cbinsights.com/blog/venture-capital-demographics
-87-percent-vc-backed-founders-white-asian-teams-raise-largest-funding.
97. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS . . . AND HOW
IT‘S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 50–51
(2002); Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE
CAPITAL 71, 73 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010) (explaining that angel investors
tend to limit their investments to startups within a three-hour drive); Randall
Stross, It’s Not Who You Know. It’s Where You Are, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006,
at BU3 (reporting that some venture capital firms in Silicon Valley adhere to a
―twenty minute rule,‖ which provides that ―if a start-up company seeking venture capital is not within a 20-minute drive of the venture firm‘s offices, it will
not be funded‖).
98. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 287.
99. Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 515,
521–23 (2014); Simon & Barr, supra note 77.
100. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 518.

SCHWARTZ_4fmt

624

1/3/2016 12:57 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:609

than a traditional public offering, crowdfunding will provide an
opportunity for anyone with an idea to go online and seek funding to make it a reality. Not just those in Silicon Valley; not
just those with wealthy friends; not just those with connections.
Crowdfunding will be open to anyone and can thereby create a
startup nation where every state and locality, and every field of
endeavor,101 is the subject of active entrepreneurship.
Is this inclusive vision realistic? Based on results in reward
crowdfunding and related fields, there is good reason to expect
it to come to fruition. Consider the issue of female and minority
entrepreneurs, who have long had a more difficult time obtaining financing from traditional sources such as banks.102 In reward crowdfunding, by contrast, it turns out that female founders are ―considerably more likely to successful [sic] raise capital
than male founders,‖ all else being equal.103 Similarly, in the
related field of peer-to-peer lending, where consumers make
online loans to one another, lenders are less influenced by racial and other stereotypes than are banks and other traditional
financial institutions.104 These bits of evidence buttress the expectation that crowdfunding will be more egalitarian and inclusive than traditional forms of business finance.
To summarize this Subsection: the first goal of crowdfunding is to create an inclusive culture of entrepreneurship open to
all Americans and, considering the above discussion, crowdfunding is well positioned to meet this goal.
2. Digital Shareholders
The second goal of crowdfunding is to democratize the
101. Crowdfunding may not be appropriate for every type of business. For
one important example, ventures that are heavily dependent on intellectual
property, such as a new invention, may wish to avoid crowdfunding so as not
to give away their valuable secrets. They may be better off looking for VC or
angel funding and requiring that potential investors sign a non-disclosure
agreement, an action that would be infeasible or ineffective in the crowdfunding context. Alternatively, such ventures may be able to avoid giving away secrets by providing the crowd with only vague information.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 93–96.
103. Jason Greenberg & Ethan Mollick, Leaning in or Leaning on? Gender,
Homophily, and Activism in Crowdfunding (July 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis omitted), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462254; cf. Slade, supra
note 95 (―Crowdfunding eliminates bias . . . allowing true market interest to
decide which ideas live or die.‖).
104. Michal Herzenstein et al., The Democratization of Personal Consumer
Loans? Determinants of Success in Online Peer-to-Peer Loan Auctions 31
(Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rice.edu/nationalmedia/
multimedia/online.
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market for investing in startup companies. For decades, the
chance to invest in private startups has been legally available
only to wealthy investors and friends of the founders.105 This
differential treatment between the wealthy and the rest was an
artifact of two exemptions embedded in federal securities law.
First, the law has always exempted private offerings from
the registration requirement, that is, offerings made available
to an exclusive group of known people, not the general public.106 Second, there is a longstanding exemption for offerings
made only to wealthy investors that are ―accredited‖ by the
SEC to make such investments.107 This latter exemption dates
back to an SEC regulation adopted in 1982, which clarified that
wealthy people—those with a net worth of more than $1 million—were deemed to be ―accredited.‖108
The practical effect of these two exemptions is that entrepreneurs do everything they can to avoid making an offering to
the public109 and instead sell unregistered securities of their
startup companies only to people that come within either the
private offering exemption (family and friends) or the accredited investor exemption (the wealthy).110 Non-millionaires have
been left out, effectively barred from investing in strangers‘
startup companies, thanks to this regulatory apparatus.
Crowdfunding is designed to break down this barrier by
empowering ordinary non-accredited investors—―digital shareholders‖111—to take a chance and invest in the same type of unregistered securities of a stranger‘s startup.112 Digital share105. See Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 3389 (―Securities law‘s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments . . . that
everyone else does not.‖).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012) (exempting certain transactions from
prohibitions relating to the sale of transactions).
107. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013); see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
108. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5), 230.215(e).
109. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337,
338 (2013) (recounting Facebook‘s efforts to avoid an initial public offering).
110. Press Release, White House, supra note 6 (―Right now, you can only
turn to a limited group of investors—including banks and wealthy individuals—to get funding. Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible
for others to invest.‖).
111. The term ―shareholder‖ is used loosely here to include investors holding any type of security, not just common stock. See supra note 7.
112. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 n.12 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–240, 249) (―[C]rowdfunding is premised on permitting
sales of securities to any interested person, not just to investors who meet spe-
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holders will be skilled with the Internet and open to new
things—after all, they tried crowdfunding.
Digital shareholders will likely be a diverse community,113
simply because it will be open to anyone and everyone.114 This
prediction is buttressed by the current experience in reward
crowdfunding, where the community of investors is diverse, at
least in terms of demographics. Backers come from every income level, with half of backers making under $50,000 per
year.115 Women comprise almost half of the backers on Kickstarter.116 Kickstarter is accessible to people of every age, ethnicity, and political persuasion.117
Digital shareholders will be particularly diverse compared
to the traditional sources of entrepreneurial financing, angel
investors, venture capitalists and public shareholders.118 Angel
groups and VC funds are made up exclusively of accredited investors.119 Crowdfunding will be open to everyone.120 Angels
cific qualifications, such as accredited investors.‖); Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 13)
(―Inclusivity is part of the essential nature of securities crowdfunding; it is
what makes crowdfunding different from other methods of selling securities.‖).
113. This does not mean to assert that Americans will participate in line
with overall demography, merely that the overall group of digital shareholders
will likely be diverse in many ways.
114. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: HOW THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 31 (2004) (―[T]he sheer size of most
markets, coupled with the fact that anyone with money can enter them (you
don‘t need to be admitted or hired), means that a certain level of diversity is
almost guaranteed.‖).
115. Nick Littlefield, Kickstats: 4 Things You Need To Know About the Demographics of Crowdfunding, CROWDLIFTED (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www
.crowdlifted.com/news/2013/11/kickstats-4-things-you-need-to-know-about-the
-demographics-of-crowdfunding#.
116. Dan Marom, Alicia Robb & Orly Sade, Gender Dynamics in Crowdfunding (Kickstarter): Evidence on Entrepreneurs, Investors, Deals and Taste
Based Discrimination 7 (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442954.
117. See Littlefield, supra note 115 (suggesting that people of diverse backgrounds participate in crowdfunding through Kickstarter).
118. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,434 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239–240, 249) (―Congress intended for investment opportunities
through crowdfunding transactions . . . to be available to all types of investors . . . .‖); Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 611 (―Crowdfunding brings the masses
of everyday retail investors into what historically has been the nearly exclusive domain of venture capitalists and other wealthy investors.‖).
119. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 3397–402 (describing the role of angel and
VC investors in accredited investing).
120. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431.
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and VCs tend to invest in certain geographic areas, including
Silicon Valley and New York.121 Crowdfunding will be a nationwide (or statewide) market available to anyone with an Internet connection.122 Digital shareholders will likely be even
more diverse than shareholders of public companies. The
shareholder base of large public companies these days is primarily made up of institutional entities.123 Retail investors
trading shares for their own account comprises a rather small
share of the contemporary public market.124 Crowdfunding will
present the opposite situation, for the entire body of investors
will be individual digital shareholders.125
The inclusive vision of crowdfunding has been criticized by
some as nothing more than a nefarious scheme to give ―middle
class families the same opportunities that millionaires have
always had to lose their money.‖126 While it is true that many
121. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 283–84.
122. This represents just about everyone, as more than 98% of Americans
can reportedly access the Internet by either wired or wireless connection. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMMUNITY-BASED BROADBAND SOLUTIONS 3
(2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/community-based_
broadband_report_by_executive_office_of_the_president.pdf; THOM FILE &
CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2013 (2014), http://www.census.gov/history/pdf/2013computer
use.pdf (reporting that about three-quarters of American households have Internet access at home).
123. Institutional investors hold 70% of the shares of the largest public
companies. Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 n.9 (2014) (citing CONFERENCE BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13 (2010)); see
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 863, 875 (2013) (―Put graphically but not metaphorically, representatives
of institutions that collectively represent effective control of many large U.S.
corporations could fit around a boardroom table.‖).
124. See Edelman et al., supra note 123.
125. See Littlefield, supra note 115 (―Kickstarter‘s core user is decidedly
not from the same demographic profile as the standard equity investor.‖). The
originating statute does not appear to prohibit institutional investors or other
legal persons from participating in crowdfunding, but the presumption is that
the investors will be natural persons. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-116, 126 Stat. 316–18 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o (2012)); Littlefield, supra note 115 (analyzing Kickstarter‘s over 5.5 million individual contributors).
126. 157 CONG. REC. H7286 (Nov. 3, 2011) (statement by Rep. Polis). See
generally Andrew A. Schwartz, The Nonpecuniary Benefits of Crowdfunding,
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565 (2015) (addressing critics‘ concern that investors will yield negative returns through crowdfunding and enumerating the
benefits of crowdfunding).
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crowdfunded companies will surely fail, it seems only fair to
give everyone, not just the wealthy and connected, the freedom
to take their chances and invest a small amount in what they
hope will be the next Uber.127
Will non-accredited, retail investors take advantage of this
opportunity to become digital shareholders? It seems likely
they will. Consider the very existence of the securities laws.
The underlying concern of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was that
people will gladly hand their money over to entrepreneurs if allowed to do so.128 Those laws, including the registration requirement, erected a barricade between untested startup companies and retail investors that has stood for almost a
century.129 The JOBS Act drills a hole in that wall.130 There is
every reason to expect that American investors will act just as
they always have and buy into the prospect that this or that
company is the next big thing. A hint of the enthusiasm that
investors may show for crowdfunding securities has already
been seen on reward crowdfunding websites.131 The immense
and growing popularity of reward crowdfunding provides
ground for optimism regarding the prospects that investors of
127. 157 CONG. REC. H7287 (Nov. 3, 2011) (statement by Rep. Polis)
(―[M]ost of these companies aren‘t going to work out. That‘s the nature of capitalism. Most of them are going to go out of business. . . . But do you know
what? Some of them are going to work out. We could see the next Google, the
next Yahoo!, the next Microsoft. Many of these companies started as garage
companies, funded by proverbial friends and family. The next great American
success story can be funded by crowd[fund]ing. It can have thousands of investors from middle class families across the country, earning millions of dollars
on their investments . . . .‖). Uber, an app-based transportation company, was
founded in 2009 and valued five years later at over $40 billion. Douglas MacMillan et al., Investors Push Uber’s Valuation Past $40 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 2014, at A1.
128. See Hazen, supra note 11, at 1741 (noting that the registration, disclosure, and reporting requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Act sought to protect
consumers).
129. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1460, 1468–70 (describing the complexities
of the registration requirement under the 1933 Securities Act).
130. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the
Federalist Society’s Panelist Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets: The
Jobs Act,” 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453, 488 (2013) (calling the JOBS Act ―the biggest deregulatory statute in the history of American securities regulation‖
(quoting Professor Robert Thompson)).
131. As of July 2010, promoters on Kickstarter had raised a total of $15
million for 1600 projects. Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online
Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 73 (2011). Five years later, the total is more than 100
times larger. Stats, supra note 36 (reporting that $2 billion has been pledged
for more than 94,000 projects).

SCHWARTZ_4fmt

2015]

1/3/2016 12:57 PM

THE DIGITAL SHAREHOLDER

629

all types will embrace the opportunity that the JOBS Act provides.132
In short, crowdfunding is designed to, and likely will, give
rise to the phenomenon of the digital shareholder, a new, inclusive and diverse class of investor that will democratize the
market for entrepreneurial financing.
II. THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE
The vision of crowdfunding just described133 is a compelling
one, but the form faces significant obstacles. It is generally accepted in the literature that all methods of investing pose three
fundamental problems that must be addressed in order for the
form to function: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs.134 This Part introduces this ―trio of problems‖135
and explains why they will present themselves in ―extreme
form‖ in the context of crowdfunding.136
A. UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty is inherent in investing because the future is
unpredictable.137 There is no way to know in advance which
companies will succeed and which will fail, yet the nature of investing is that one must hand over one‘s money based on
guesses about how the future will play out. Thus, the term uncertainty, as used here, refers to ―contingencies that none of the
parties can definitively predict (for example, the success of a
132. See supra note 131.
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. This tripartite analysis was first presented, at least in this crystallized form, in Gilson, supra note 17 (―Absent a workable response, the extremity of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency problems likely would
raise the cost of external capital to a point of market failure.‖). It has since
been widely adopted by numerous other scholars. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note
17, at 48 (―VC scholarship has [long] been concerned with primarily one question: How do VC investors respond to the extreme uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency problems inherent in VC investment?‖ (citing Gilson,
supra note 17)); Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt As Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1169, 1190 (―One of the most-discussed topics in the venture capital literature is how VCs select and monitor start-ups in the face of extreme levels of
uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency costs.‖ (citing Gilson, supra
note 17)); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 767, 792 (2015) (―[E]very business must address . . . uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.‖ (citing Gilson, supra note 17)).
135. Gilson, supra note 17.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 1076–77.
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firm‘s research and commercialization efforts, the market‘s ultimate receptivity to a firm‘s product, the success of competing
research efforts, and macroeconomic and industry conditions).‖138
Crowdfunding is designed as a vehicle to fund startups at
their infancy,139 which necessarily present a much greater degree of uncertainty than do existing businesses.140 An investment in a toll bridge must be made in part on the basis of the
anticipated traffic volume, but that cannot be predicted with
certainty, making the investment uncertain. Compare the toll
bridge investment with an investment in a startup coordinating
―rideshares‖ over that bridge through smartphones.141 The latter is clearly subject to many additional levels, layers and
forms of uncertainty regarding technology, commuter acceptance, government regulation or prohibition, the outcome of
strategic decisions, and myriad other considerations.142
In short, uncertainty is at a height for the type of startups
that will use crowdfunding, making potential investors reticent
to invest. More formally, uncertainty raises the cost of capital
and, at the extreme, could shut off a company from financing
entirely.143 It must be addressed for crowdfunding to function.

138. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 874, 879 n.14 (2003).
139. Crowdfunding is generally available for any type of private company,
but its core goal is to advance startup companies. See supra note 5. But cf.
Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding for Startups Across the
Private Equity Gap, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 25) (suggesting that crowdfunding would be most useful for companies that have already attracted angel investors).
140. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 121 (2010)
(―Because startup companies are new ventures operating outside of established markets, investing in them involves substantial uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.‖); Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation:
The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 901 (2010).
141. See, e.g., CARMA, http://carmacarpool.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015)
(offering a commission-based smartphone app that ―enables you to find nearby
people going your way so you can share your commute . . . [and] the cost of the
journey‖).
142. See Cable, supra note 140 (explaining that uncertainty is inherent in
startups because their innovative products and business design remain untested).
143. Gilson, supra note 17.
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B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
The idea of information asymmetry is that there is certain
information that is known to founders, promoters, managers or
other insiders, but not investors.144 Consider an investment in
a farm. Plainly the farmer knows much more about the land
and its operation—which fields have good drainage; whether
the tractor is rusty; the planting habits of her neighbors—than
do the investors. This sort of information asymmetry is exacerbated in the startup context, particularly if there is technology
or science involved.145 Computer code, for example, is not easy
to read or review; the programmer herself will surely know her
code better than anyone on the outside looking in.
Information asymmetry can lead to a market failure due to
adverse selection, also known as the ―lemons‖ problem, famously espoused through the example of used cars.146 The lemons
problem is this: Potential investors are aware that company insiders hold important information that they (the investors) can
never truly know, and this makes it difficult to distinguish between good and bad investments. Investors can therefore be
expected to discount all investments, including the good ones.
Absent intervention, the expected effect is that all good investments will depart out of the market, leaving only bad ones.147
Information asymmetry, and the lemons problem it can
cause, applies forcefully to crowdfunding.148 Crowdfunding entrepreneurs will know much better than digital shareholders
how successful their venture is likely to be.149 Consider the case
of a downtown café. The founder knows how many other cafes
already exist in the neighborhood, the going price for a cappuc144. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 138 (―‗[I]nformation asymmetry‘ refers to
circumstances in which one party knows more about a particular fact relevant
to the business than the other party does (for example, an employee or manager knows more about how hard she works than the venture capitalist does).‖).
145. Gilson, supra note 17.
146. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–91 (1970).
147. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 784 (2001) (explaining that
information asymmetry and adverse selection can combine to drive most of the
honest share-issuers out of securities markets); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669, 673–76 (1984) (discussing the ―lemons‖ problem in securities markets and proposing potential solutions).
148. Tomboc, supra note 14, at 266; id. at 267 (―[O]nline investors face
greater uncertainty than investors in offline brick and mortar businesses.‖).
149. See id. at 266.
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cino, how hard she plans to work, and a thousand other things
unknown to potential investors. All this represents information
asymmetry.
Furthermore, because promising entrepreneurs can be expected to have alternative avenues for financing, some commentators predict that those with good prospects will prefer
other financing sources (such as angel investors and VCs), leaving crowdfunding investors with the leftovers.150 To some extent, this critique can be countered by the fact that an entrepreneur need not necessarily choose between crowdfunding and
the alternatives.151 But this is not a complete answer, and the
lemons problem is a real one for crowdfunding.152
To summarize, crowdfunded startups present a great deal
of information asymmetry. If this issue is not sufficiently addressed, digital shareholders will refuse to invest and the market will not function.
C. AGENCY COSTS
An ―agency‖ relationship is one in which one party, the
―principal,‖ hires another party, the ―agent,‖ to perform some
service for the benefit of the principal.153 Agency relationships
can be tremendously valuable, for instance when an agent has
specialized knowledge and training.154 All agency relationships,
150. E.g., Dorff, supra note 14, at 497 (―[I]t seems unlikely that any business that could obtain angel investments would seek out crowdfunding instead. Crowdfunding is therefore likely to attract those businesses that are
least likely to succeed.‖); id. at 517 (―[E]quity crowdfunders will have available
to them only those opportunities already rejected by more sophisticated investors.‖).
151. This has already occurred in an analogous space: SCiO, a startup
making a small and affordable molecular sensor, raised $2.7 million through
reward crowdfunding and millions more through accredited-only investing.
Zack Miller, Don’t Believe These 4 Myths About Equity Crowdfunding, OUR
CROWD (Dec. 3, 2014), http://blog.ourcrowd.com/index.php/2014/12/03/dont
-believe-these-4-myths-about-equity-crowdfunding; SCiO: Your Sixth Sense: A
Pocket Molecular Sensor for All!, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter
.com/projects/903107259/scio-your-sixth-sense-a-pocket-molecular-sensor-fo
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
152. See Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 591–603 (identifying the potential for a
―lemons‖ problem as a result of crowdfunding); Tomboc, supra note 14, at 266
(explaining the ―lemons‖ problem in crowdfunding).
153. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308 (1976).
154. Consider the case of a surgeon who acts as the agent for the patientprincipal, providing services the patient obviously could not perform on herself.
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however, suffer from a fundamental downside, namely that the
agent‘s position allows her to act in her own interest as opposed
to that of the principal.155 This divergence of interests is formally known as ―agency costs.‖156
Agency costs have been known since at least the age of Adam Smith157 and are a ―pervasive fact of economic life.‖158 Consider the following examples of agent misbehavior familiar
from lived experience: an employee spends her time surfing the
Internet rather than advancing the company‘s interest;159 a
bartender provides drinks for cash and pockets the proceeds;160
an investment bank‘s advice is tainted by personal interest.161
Most important for present purposes, agency cost theory
has played a dominant role in understanding business organizations, including both public companies162 and private
startups.163 The investors, as the ―owners‖ of the corporation,
are seen as the principals. The top corporate managers are the
agents of the investors, running the company for the latter‘s
benefit.164 This analogy is imperfect,165 but it has served as a
155. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
Modern Library 1937) (1776) (―[M]anagers . . . of other people‘s money . . .
cannot well be expected [to] watch over it with the same anxious vigilance
with which . . . [people] watch over their own.‖).
158. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
159. PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK 38 (2009).
160. Don’t Let Your Bartenders Rob You Blind!, BOB JOHNSON‘S SCHOOL OF
BAR MGMT., http://www.bobthebarguy.com/bmc.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
161. E.g., In re El Paso Corp. S‘holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434, 440, 442
(Del. Ch. 2012) (finding that Goldman Sachs, serving as advisor (agent) to El
Paso in its sale to Kinder Morgan, had a ―bias toward a suboptimally priced
deal with Kinder Morgan‖ because it owned ―approximately 19%, or $4 billion
worth, of Kinder Morgan stock,‖ and because ―the lead Goldman banker working for El Paso . . . personally owned approximately $340,000 of Kinder Morgan stock‖); cf. id. at 434 (―Although Goldman‘s conflict was known, inadequate efforts to cabin its role were made . . . .‖).
162. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 178 (11th ed. 2010) (explaining the dynamic
between shareholder-agents and corporate manager-principals); George S.
Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 976 (2007).
163. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 51 (―[T]he influence of agency cost theory is
clearly evident in virtually any discussion of VC investment.‖).
164. Geis, supra note 162; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309
(―[T]he relationship between the stockholders and manager of a corporation fit
the definition of a pure agency relationship.‖).
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useful model for almost a century, since the path-breaking
work of Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means.166
Their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, argued that the dispersed nature of public shareholders ―produces a condition where the interests of owner and of
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge.‖167 This ―separation of ownership and control‖ identified by Berle and Means
was formalized and rechristened in the 1970s as ―agency costs‖
by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling.168 Golf courses,169 sculpture gardens,170 and corporate jets171 are seen by
some as expressions of the agency costs present in the traditional public company. As for private companies funded by VCs,
the agency costs look somewhat different on the surface, but
the basic problem is the same.172 Management, being human,
will be constantly tempted to put their own interests ahead of
those of their investors.
Once crowdfunding goes live, and people across the country
invest in companies via online portals, the management of these companies will assume the position of agents, and the digital
shareholders will act as principals. This will surely lead to the
same sort of agency costs we have long observed in other contexts. Moreover, each investor will likely have a small amount
at stake, thanks to the annual cap, akin to the traditional
Berle-Means public corporation with dispersed shareholders.173
165. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1672 (―[M]ost scholars would probably agree that shareholders are not really ‗owners‘ in the traditional sense . . . .‖ (collecting authorities)); see also Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS, supra note 158, at 56
(―To an experienced corporate lawyer . . . the assertion that corporate managers are agents of investors, whether debtholders or stockholders, will seem odd
or loose.‖).
166. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see Bartlett, supra note 17, at 50 (stating
that agency cost analysis is ―the primary analytical framework used in contemporary corporate scholarship‖).
167. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 6.
168. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 327.
169. See, e.g., Jacob Bunge, DuPont Holds onto Rare Assets, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 2014, at B10.
170. See, e.g., Rachel A. Antman, Modern Sculptures, Outdoors and Free,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at F7 (describing the Donald M. Kendall Sculpture
Gardens at PepsiCo‘s headquarters in Purchase, New York).
171. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, The Annual CEO Pay Survey: Firms Still
Pay for Personal Jet Use, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2014, at B5.
172. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077.
173. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 47–68.
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Management will be in control of the company on a day-to-day
basis,174 and would seem to be just as prone to shirking, stealing, and generally acting against the investors‘ interest as any
other agent would be.
In other words, crowdfunded company managers are in an
analogous position to public company managers vis-à-vis their
shareholders. They will be managing ―other people‘s money,‖175
and the usual agency costs will be present in the crowdfunding
context as well. For example, if a rock band were to crowdfund
securities that promise investors a portion of the profits from
an upcoming tour, the investors are analogous to principals and
the band is analogous to their agent. It is easy to imagine the
band taking limousines to their shows, enjoying lovely buffets
backstage, and throwing great after-parties—even though these perks will cut into the investors‘ profit.
Dealing with agency costs like these in the crowdfunding
context is in the interest of all parties. For investors, the reason
is obvious: they want the founders, promoters, and managers to
do a good and faithful job running the company. As for promoters, they realize that no one will invest in the company (or will
only do so at a high cost of capital) unless they can assure potential investors that agency costs will be sufficiently cabined.176 Agency costs must be addressed for crowdfunding to
function.
This Part showed that erecting the legislative apparatus
for crowdfunding is not enough to ensure that it will actually
work. Crowdfunding must somehow solve the three fundamental problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs, or be doomed to failure.
The next two Parts take up this challenge. Part III will examine other related contexts where these three problems have
been resolved, namely venture capital, angel investing, and
public companies. The goal of Part III is to determine whether
the techniques employed in those traditional forms of entrepreneurial finance for addressing the trio of problems would be
appropriate for crowdfunding. Finally, Part IV will introduce a
set of new and different responses specifically designed for
crowdfunding.
III. MOST TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES WILL NOT
174. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015).
175. SMITH, supra note 157.
176. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309.
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TRANSLATE TO CROWDFUNDING
The three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance—uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
costs—are not new to crowdfunding. To the contrary, they have
long been known by the traditional sources of American entrepreneurial finance: venture capitalists, angel investors, and
public shareholders. More importantly, each has responded to
the trio of problems with methods that suit their particular institutional context.
Rather than reinventing the wheel, it makes sense to ask
first whether any of these techniques are appropriate for use in
crowdfunding. Unfortunately, as this Part will show, none of
the important and effective methods for addressing the trio of
problems that have been developed by VCs, angels, or public
investors will be of much use for crowdfunding.
In a way, this should come as no surprise, as the economic
circumstances are divergent. Public companies are raising
hundreds of millions of dollars, VCs invest tens of millions of
dollars, and even angel investments are generally over $1 million. All crowdfunding rounds, by contrast, will be under $1
million, per the statute.177 The mechanisms that make sense
for raising many millions of dollars will understandably differ
from those that make sense in the $100,000s.178
This Part will review the key methods that VCs, angels,
and public companies use to respond to the three problems of
entrepreneurial finance and explain why those solutions will
mostly not translate well to crowdfunding.
A. SOLUTIONS FROM VENTURE CAPITAL
Venture capitalists invest in high-risk, high-growth
startup companies at an early stage of their development,179
when the trio of problems present themselves in ―extreme
form.‖180 Uncertainty as to how the startup will perform is
greatly magnified because it is in such an early stage. Many future decisions will have to be made by management, and the
outcome of those decisions, and the effort expended, are highly
177. Indeed, they may be under $500,000 to avoid the cost of audited financial statements. See supra note 57.
178. Part IV will introduce a set of new methods that are particularly suited to the crowdfunding context.
179. See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE (2d ed. 2004).
180. See Gilson, supra note 17.
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uncertain.181 If the business has a technological component,
this adds scientific uncertainty.182 Information asymmetries between VCs and founders are also a major problem because the
entrepreneur‘s ―intentions and abilities‖ are known to her but
not the VC.183 Finally, agency costs are potentially quite significant for VCs,184 in part because the entrepreneur‘s interests
can ―sharply diverge from those of the venture capital investors, especially with respect to the risk level and duration of the
investment.‖185
The American VC market has succeeded in the face of all
these obstacles, funding such notable successes as Google186
and Facebook.187 VCs have created and honed methods and
techniques to address the trio of problems that make sense in
this distinctive institutional context. The core of the VC solution is the syndicated and geographically concentrated use of
comprehensive investment contracts that ―allow venture capitalists to screen, monitor, and control their investments‖
through a combination of staged financing, convertible preferred shares, control rights, and equity-based compensation.188
Can these mechanisms be borrowed by crowdfunding? As
will appear, most of the key methods used by VCs are inappropriate for crowdfunding.
1. Staged Financing
Instead of conveying their entire investment to a startup
all at once, VCs stage their financing by divvying the money up
over time, and conditioning the payouts on achieving designat-

181. See id. at 1077.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 40.
185. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077.
186. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 38 (―In 1999, two venture capital (VC) firms
invested $25 million in a newly formed Internet search firm called Google.
Four years later, after Google‘s initial public offering (IPO), their investment
was worth over $4 billion.‖).
187. Ari Levy, Accel Facebook Bet Poised To Become Biggest Venture Profit:
Tech, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2012-01-18/accel-s-facebook-bet-poised-to-become-biggest
-ever-venture-profit-tech (reporting that venture capital fund Accel Partners
made a $12.2 million investment in Facebook in 2005 that had grown to be
worth $10 billion in 2012).
188. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2008).
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ed milestones projected by management.189 Staged financing is
a highly potent method of addressing the three problems of entrepreneurial finance.190 It reduces information asymmetry by
making entrepreneurs ―less likely to exaggerate a company‘s
prospects in negotiating with a VC investor,‖191 and it reduces
agency costs by providing ―a powerful incentive for managers to
meet designated milestones in order to receive future financing.‖192 Can staged financing be used in crowdfunding? As will
appear, a form of staged financing may indeed be relevant to
the crowdfunding context, but likely only rarely.
Formal staged financing will likely not play much of a role
in crowdfunding. In theory, a crowdfunding intermediary could
collect money from the crowd, and then dole it out to an issuer
over time, contingent on hitting agreed-upon benchmarks. This
idea has merit in the crowdfunding context, for all the same
reasons it does in the VC world, but it is not clearly allowed
under the JOBS Act. That statute directs crowdfunding intermediaries to convey the offering proceeds to the issuer once it
reaches its goal.193 The intermediary is not clearly authorized
to hold back a portion of the funds.194
An informal type of staged financing may nevertheless be
used in the crowdfunding context, whereby crowdfunding companies return to the crowd for financing year after year. A company could, for instance, seek to crowdfund $1 million per year
for several years, and would promise the crowd that it would
hit certain annual benchmarks. If it fails to meet the benchmarks in a given year, it will surely find it difficult to convince
the crowd to fund it for the next year. This places pressure on
the management to meet the benchmarks, thereby ameliorating the trio of problems.
The pressure on management will likely be much less intense than in the VC context because the consequences of missing a set of benchmarks is much lower for crowdfunding man189. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J.
CORP. L. 949, 952 (1999).
190. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 179, at 171 (―Staged capital infusions
are the most potent control mechanism a venture capitalist can employ.‖);
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 54.
191. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 52.
192. Id.; see also Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1413.
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012) (stating that intermediaries must
―ensure that all offering proceeds are only provided to the issuer‖ once it
reaches its goal).
194. Nor is the intermediary clearly prohibited from doing so.
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agers. In traditional VC staged financing, a legal promise of future funding is conditioned on meeting the benchmarks. In this
type of informal staged financing for crowdfunding, by contrast,
each year‘s fundraising would be legally independent from every other. Hitting the benchmarks in one year will merely raise
the chances of successfully raising money next year; it does not
oblige the crowd to continue financing the company. Thus the
disciplining effect of staged financing, so powerful in the VC
context, will be more moderate in the world of crowdfunding.
In addition, it is unclear how many companies will engage
in crowdfunding year after year. On the one hand, if the company goes out of business—a likely outcome for many crowdfunded startups—then it will never return to the crowd. On the
other hand, if the company succeeds, it may be able to meet its
own financing needs from profits, or will have other sources of
financing, such as bank loans. Only those companies that have
neither crashed nor outgrown the crowd will return repeatedly.
How many will fit that bill is hard to predict.
In conclusion, informal staged financing holds some promise for at least some crowdfunding companies.
2. Preferred Stock
Most VC investments are in preferred stock,195 which is a
security that gives the holder (the VC investor) various preferential economic rights, including most notably a ―liquidation
preference‖ that would come into play in the event of the company‘s liquidation or sale.196 Preferred stock is generally convertible to common stock at the election of the holder, and if the
preferred stock has ―participation‖ rights, its holders may receive the preferred liquidation preference plus convert the preferred stock to common stock, thereby also ―participating‖ in
the residual profits of the liquidated firm.197
VCs are understood to use preferred stock to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. The ex ante liquidation
preference of preferred stock serves a signaling function that
195. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 138, at 875.
196. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 54. Other common rights include preferential dividend rights, redemption rights and antidilution protection. Id.
197. Id. The total value of preferred stock is equal to the liquidation preference plus the expected value of any participation right. The liquidation preference is much more easily observable because it is declared in the company‘s
charter and the VC‘s stock purchase agreement, whereas the expected liquidation value of common stock upon a trade sale is highly speculative.
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helps investors identify promising entrepreneurs—information
that is otherwise asymmetrically known. An entrepreneur who
believes that the company will be worth more than the liquidation preference would be willing to grant such a preference to
an investor; an entrepreneur without such confidence would
not.198 And as for the latter, the preferential rights held by the
VC create an incentive for management to meet their financial
projections.199
Crowdfunding will not likely make much use of preferred
stock because the cost of negotiating the liquidation preference,
participation rights and dozens of other attributes is not feasible in this context. Preferred stock is a complex instrument
with technical terms that are actively negotiated among VCs
and entrepreneurs using expert counsel.200 But one of the foundational purposes of crowdfunding is to be a simple securities
market that poses extremely low costs of raising capital and is
therefore accessible to a wide swath of early-stage entrepreneurs.201 Bespoke contract drafting by an attorney, especially
an expert, will be far too costly for most crowdfunding ventures.202 Even if it were affordable, there will be no one on the
investor side to ask for convertible preferred stock or negotiate
its provisions.
Second, preferred stock is generally convertible to common
stock at the option of the holder, so the problems that go with
equity would apply here too. As I have discussed elsewhere,
there are good reasons for startups to avoid selling common
stock through crowdfunding.203 The sale of equity exposes
founders to personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty and
empowers shareholders with the right to vote, demand books
and records, and otherwise distracts management.204 For these
reasons too, crowdfunding entrepreneurs are likely to sell some
security other than convertible preferred stock.
In short, preferred stock, though quite useful in the VC
context, is not appropriate for use in crowdfunding.

198. Id.
199. Id. at 55.
200. Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 633 n.239 (describing some of the key
points of negotiation).
201. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1466–73; supra Part I.B.1.
202. Cf. Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 626.
203. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1483–87.
204. See id.
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3. Control Rights
As a mechanism for addressing agency costs, VCs routinely
demand that they be granted certain powers of control, including a seat on the board of directors and negative covenants giving the VC the power to veto important corporate actions.205
These methods will not translate to crowdfunding.
A seat on the board of directors must be occupied by a single natural person, not a crowd.206 A VC fund manager may
take the position herself or can easily designate such a person,
but the coordination costs of having a crowd of digital shareholders select a representative are likely too high to make it
worthwhile. And even if the crowd were able to do so, entrepreneurs are unlikely to be interested. It is one thing to give a
board seat to a VC fund manager whom the entrepreneur has
come to know personally and gets along with. But it is quite
another to simply take whomever the crowd selects. A VC‘s
nominee is likely to have expertise and provide a benefit to the
company, but this seems much less likely in the crowdfunding
context.
As for negative covenants, most entrepreneurs will be unwilling to yield control to the crowd in this way for many of the
same reasons that they will likely sell only a minority voting
interest to the crowd.207 It may be reasonable to put the future
of one‘s startup in the hands of an experienced VC fund manager in exchange for millions of dollars of financing. By contrast, it is hard to imagine an entrepreneur allowing the crowd
to control the startup‘s destiny for sums under $1 million.208
In summary, control rights of the sort used by VCs to address agency costs will play no role in crowdfunding.

205. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53.
206. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2015). But cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2014) (―posit[ing] a novel alternative‖ to
the rule that directors must be natural persons, namely that ―board services
could be provided by other entities, be they partnerships, corporations, limited
liability corporations, or any other type of business association‖). Were Bainbridge and Henderson‘s proposal to be adopted, crowdfunded companies could
make good use of such ―board service providers.‖ Id. At this time, however,
this remains a theoretical idea that has not been approved by any legislature.
207. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1481–82.
208. One million dollars is the most a company is allowed to raise via
crowdfunding in a year. See supra note 50.
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4. Equity-Based Compensation
Corporate managers can be compensated in a manner that
addresses the fundamental problem of agency costs. One important method used by VCs is to pay management primarily
in company stock, thereby making them into shareholders
themselves.209 Compensating managers with common stock,
and requiring them to hold it for some time, aligns the interests
of the management with those of the VC investors in order to
ameliorate agency costs.210
Equity-based compensation of this sort is among the weaker mechanisms used by VCs. Moreover, it will not be relevant
for at least a large swath of crowdfunding companies. First,
there is good reason to expect that most crowdfunding entrepreneurs will retain all or a majority of the equity in the company and sell debt or other securities to the crowd.211 Where a
founder holds most of the equity, she is already incentivized to
work hard for the company; ladling on even more would not
seem to be worth the candle.212 Second, the design of an equitybased compensation package is a complex and nuanced task.
While it may make sense for sophisticated and experienced VCs
to negotiate with an entrepreneur to develop a sensible equitybased compensation package, it is likely an inappropriate tool
for digital shareholders to employ.
For these reasons, equity-based compensation will likely
play a relatively small role in addressing agency costs at crowdfunded companies.
5. Geographic Proximity
A final way in which VC firms respond to uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs is by keeping their investments close to home.213 The industry is ―remarkably local209. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53. See generally, e.g., LUCIAN BEB(2004).
210. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53.
211. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459–77 (predicting that most crowdfunding entrepreneurs will sell debt or other non-equity securities to the
crowd); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 335, 360–61 (2012) (suggesting
the use of ―unequity,‖ ―a particular type of financial interest that provides for
profit-sharing or revenue-sharing on a short-term basis, with no accompanying governance rights‖).
212. The same is true if the entrepreneur holds a majority of the equity,
though to a lesser extent.
213. See Gilson, supra note 17, at 1087.
CHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE
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ized,‖214 with Silicon Valley VCs investing in companies based
in Northern California and New York VCs investing on the
East Coast.215 This geographic concentration by VCs216 is an
important method of addressing uncertainty and information
asymmetry by enhancing the ability of the VC to conduct due
diligence.217 Information asymmetry is further reduced by the
reputation market that works well in a local community.218 Finally, geographic concentration enhances monitoring and thus
helps address agency costs.219
Geographic concentration will not be a terribly useful technique for crowdfunding to address the trio of problems.220 Preliminarily, digital shareholders will come from every part of the
country and will be allowed to invest anywhere they wish.221
Many will surely spread their investments from coast-to-coast,
as they do in reward crowdfunding.222 Be that as it may, at
least some digital shareholders are likely to focus on companies
local to their domicile. There may be such a group, as the vibrancy of the ―eat local‖ movement demonstrates.223 Indeed, the
SEC‘s Regulation Crowdfunding specifically authorizes portals
to focus on a certain geographic area.224
Yet even for these sorts of digital shareholders who focus
on a certain city or region, the reasons why VC investors use
this method do not apply to them: digital shareholders will not
214. Id.
215. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286–87; see FLORIDA, supra note 97 (noting
that VC investments are concentrated in particular regions).
216. And angel investors, as discussed infra Part III.B.3.
217. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 717, 730 (2010).
218. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1087.
219. See Ibrahim, supra note 217.
220. See Schwartz, supra note 5. For intrastate crowdfunding, the design is
for a state-wide market.
221. See supra Part I.B.2.
222. See Ajay K. Agrawal et al., The Geography of Crowdfunding 1 (Nat‘l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16820, 2011) (―The geographic
dispersion of investment evident in our data implies that [reward] crowdfunding . . . largely overcomes the distance-related economic frictions usually associated with financing entrepreneurial ventures.‖).
223. See, e.g., JEFF KAGAN & PAIGE DOUGHTY, Eat Local, on 21ST CENTURY
ENERGY
SUPERHEROES
(2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ihULIlqnelE (children‘s song encouraging them to ―eat local‖).
224. A portal may limit listings to those from a certain geographic location.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (notice
of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 227.402(b)(2)(ii)).
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do much, if any, physical due diligence,225 will not sit on boards
of directors, and generally will not be able to monitor the way
that VCs do, even if they live close by.226 Even assuming that
some local investors may be familiar with neighborhoods and
local needs (e.g., they know that a certain block already has
three coffee shops), this effect is quite modest compared with
the benefits that VCs obtain from geographic proximity in
terms of reducing uncertainty, information asymmetry and
agency costs.227
In short, geographic concentration will not translate well
from the VC to the crowdfunding context.
B. SOLUTIONS FROM ANGEL INVESTING
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who finance
startups with their own funds at a very early stage of their development, even earlier than VCs.228 The nature of such investments is that they present extremely high levels of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. These three
problems present themselves in much the same way as in
VC,229 but in an even more severe form because angels invest in
startups at an earlier stage.230
One might expect angels to follow the lead of VCs and employ the various techniques just described to address uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.231 It turns
out, however, that angel investors utilize a different set of solutions that suit their distinctive institutional context.232 Angels
eschew the comprehensive, detailed, and powerful investment
contracts used by VCs, instead opting for simple contracts with
few formal investor protections.233 According to the literature,
angels rely primarily on technical expertise, geographic proximity, and active participation to address uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.234 This Section examines
these methods of responding to the trio of problems and their
225. Cf. infra text accompanying note 454 (indicating that Google Maps
―Street View‖ can be used as a partial substitute for physical due diligence).
226. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
227. See infra Part III.C.5.
228. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1406.
229. See supra Part III.A.
230. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1420.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 1422–24.
233. See id. at 1422.
234. For an example of such literature, see Ibrahim, supra note 188.
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potential application to crowdfunding. Crowdfunding presents
a completely different institutional context than that of traditional angel investing, and the techniques used by angels will
not translate directly to crowdfunding.
1. Technical Expertise
Angel investors generally invest in areas in which they
have technical expertise.235 Many angels are themselves exentrepreneurs who focus their investments on the industry that
they know and previously succeeded in.236 Technical expertise
has proved to be a powerful method of addressing all three fundamental problems of investing. The angel‘s expertise ―reduces
uncertainty by allowing the angel to better gauge the start-up‘s
chances for success‖ and it ―reduces information asymmetry by
minimizing the entrepreneur‘s advantage of private information.‖237 It also responds to agency costs by enhancing the
ability of the angel to thoughtfully monitor management‘s
technical progress.238
This method of addressing the trio of problems has little
direct relevance for crowdfunding. Digital shareholders will be
ordinary people from all walks of life.239 Compared to wealthy
financiers and engineers from the likes of MIT and Stanford,240
lay people are much less able to employ expertise as a tool to
respond to the trio of problems. This idea of technical expertise
thus does not directly apply to crowdfunding. However, if we
take the concept of expertise broadly, it may hold some promise.
As Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek famously taught,
everyone from every background does indeed have expertise—
―expertise‖ in the sense of knowing something valuable that is
not generally known.241 Science is ―not the sum of all
knowledge,‖ wrote Hayek.242 Rather, there is another body of
―very important but unorganized knowledge‖: the dispersed bits
of information that each person happens to know because of
235. See Fisch, supra note 29, at 86; Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1431–32.
236. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1419.
237. Id. at 1431–32.
238. See id. at 1431 (discussing how the relationship between angels and
entrepreneurs reduces agency costs).
239. See supra Part I.B.2.
240. See Ibrahim, supra note 217, at 729.
241. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
242. Id. at 521.
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their unique experience, skills, and perspective, what Hayek
called ―the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time
and place.‖243 Thanks to this sort of expertise, every individual
―has some advantage over all others because he possesses
unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but
of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it
are left to him or are made with his active cooperation.‖244
Hayek‘s ideas describe crowdfunding well. Various digital
shareholders will hold different bits of useful information relating to crowdfunding companies, and they can choose to make
beneficial use of that information.245 For example, avid video
gamers are familiar with what makes a good game and other
aspects of the business in a way that few others could match.246
Thus a video game aficionado may focus all her crowdfunding
investments on video games. She would reduce uncertainty and
information asymmetry by sticking to her area of expertise
(video games) and would be able to monitor the progress of the
business in a thoughtful way. For example, she could volunteer
to be an early beta-tester of the game and, after playing it for a
few days, understand deeply how it stacks up against the competition on numerous dimensions.
Other examples can be given: fitness instructors can spot a
promising exercise machine; home cooks know what small appliances might succeed. None of these types of knowledge can
really be called technical expertise, but the point is that they
can nevertheless be used by digital shareholders in a manner
akin to the use of technical expertise by angel investors.247
To summarize, technical expertise as used by angel investors is not directly applicable to crowdfunding. Expertise broadly construed in the Hayekian sense, however, is indeed an appropriate method for digital shareholders to employ.
2. Active Participation
After angels make their investments, they ―actively partic243. Id. at 521–22 (referring to the same idea as ―knowledge of people, of
local conditions, and of special circumstances‖).
244. Id.
245. See Dorff, supra note 14 (stating that crowdfunders can use their relevant personal experiences to invest).
246. Cf. Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 597 (explaining why a group of video
game players would be better able to predict a video game‘s success than VC
investors).
247. These forms of expertise can also be shared with the crowd through
crowdfunded investment analysis. See infra Part IV.B.
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ipate‖ in the business.248 They make ―regular visits to the startup‘s facilities,‖ and advise management.249 This sort of active
participation in the day-to-day operation of the company is
highly analogous to the VC practice of taking a seat on the
board of directors, just less formal.250 It allows for close monitoring of management and is a key method of reducing agency
costs for angel investors.251 To put it simply: it‘s hard to slack
off when a large investor is present in the room.
Active participation in the business is clearly inappropriate
for crowdfunding.252 Digital shareholders will be passive investors—more like public shareholders than angels. Each will
have a small stake,253 making it economically irrational for any
one of them to put time and effort into helping run the business. More importantly, it is hard to imagine that entrepreneurs will even allow digital shareholders to physically come
down to the office. Unlike an experienced angel investor,254 the
crowd would not be helpful in close quarters.
In short, active participation will not translate to crowdfunding.
3. Geographic Proximity
Because of the active participation that angels practice,
and because the opportunities they pursue are based on personal connections, angel investing is a highly localized endeavor, even more than VC.255 ―Angel groups commonly have ‗local‘
names, like the ‗Pasadena Angels‘ or the ‗New York Angels,‘
and they tend to invest‖ exclusively in local startups.256
But just as in the VC context,257 geographic proximity will
likely not be a particularly important method for addressing
the trio of problems as they will arise in crowdfunding. Digital
shareholders will not find opportunities from personal connections; opportunities will be presented on Internet portals.258
248. Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1433.
249. Id.
250. See supra Part III.A.3.
251. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1433.
252. See Dorff, supra note 14, at 515.
253. See id.
254. See Cable, supra note 140, at 116.
255. See id.; Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1432.
256. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286–87.
257. See supra Part III.A.5.
258. Other types of investors benefit from ―network[s] of trust.‖ Ibrahim,
supra note 188, at 1432.
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And digital shareholders will not actively participate in the
business, as just discussed.259 There may be some role for local
knowledge, as discussed in Part III.A.5 above, but for the most
part, geographic proximity will not be appropriate for crowdfunding.
C. SOLUTIONS FROM PUBLIC COMPANIES
The most traditional form of entrepreneurial finance is
when a company ―goes public‖ in an initial public offering
(IPO).260 Examples of recent IPO firms include camera-maker
GoPro, video game producer King Digital Entertainment (best
known for Candy Crush Saga), and restaurant chain Noodles &
Company. Public companies are generally more mature than
those funded by angels or VCs, but they typically are still in an
early stage of their growth, with an average age of about five to
ten years.261 Thus just like in the VC and angel context, public
companies have had to respond to the three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance: uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs.
Agency costs are the primary problem for public companies
to overcome.262 Uncertainty and information asymmetry are
somewhat less problematic because such companies generally
have years of operating history for investors to review.263 Thus,
most of the important techniques used by public companies are
aimed specifically at addressing agency costs.
The solutions that have been adopted in the public company context differ radically from those used by VCs and angels.264 The key mechanisms, in roughly the order of importance, are mandatory disclosure, takeovers, derivative
actions, activist shareholders, equity-based compensation,
proxy contests, and appraisal. As in the previous two Sections,
259. See supra Part III.B.2.
260. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 237, 245 (2015) (describing the IPO process).
261. See IPO TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, REBUILDING THE
IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK
ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 6 (2011).
262. See generally Geis, supra note 162, at 973–82 (engaging in a comprehensive discussion of agency costs as a problem for public companies).
263. Uncertainty and information asymmetry are still quite significant in
the context of public companies. See Black, supra note 147, at 786 (―[A] company‘s shares, when the company first goes public, are like an unobservable
car, produced by an unknown manufacturer, on which investors can obtain
only dry, written information that they can‘t directly verify.‖).
264. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
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these methods generally hold very little relevance for crowdfunding.
1. Mandatory Disclosure
At the time of an IPO, the issuing company is legally required under the ‗33 Act to provide full and clear disclosure
about the company and the potential risks and rewards of investing in the securities.265 Once the securities begin trading on
a secondary market, the ‗34 Act requires the issuing company
to provide the public with ongoing, regular, and event-based
disclosures.266 Mandatory disclosure addresses both information asymmetry and agency costs in public companies. The
insiders who know lots of information about the company must
share that information with the public, thus reducing information asymmetry.267 And publishing important corporate information on the Internet (and before the Internet, on paper)
lowers the cost of monitoring for all shareholders and empowers them to protect themselves against harmful agency costs.268
The signature move of the JOBS Act, however, is to exempt
crowdfunded securities from that traditional system of mandatory disclosure (in order to lower transaction costs for issuers).269 Furthermore, traditional public companies must report
to investors at least quarterly, while crowdfunding companies
need only provide a single, simple annual report.270 Hence, the
traditional method of addressing information asymmetry and
agency costs through mandatory disclosure will not directly apply to crowdfunding.
Even so, there do remain some potentially significant disclosure obligations in the CROWDFUND Act.271 The issuer
must file with the SEC, and make available to the relevant
funding portal and potential investors, a disclosure document
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2012); id. § 77f. See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 110–59 (Thomson West 5th ed. 2006).
266. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and
Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).
267. See id.; see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET 70 (Northeastern Univ. Press rev. ed. 1995) (claiming the primary
function of the Securities Act of 1933 is to address information asymmetry).
268. See Paredes, supra note 266.
269. For a more thorough discussion of the JOBS Act‘s effects on mandatory disclosure see Berdejó, supra note 92, at 22–32.
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4).
271. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12 (describing the CROWDFUND Act as imposing ―a quite heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both
issuers and any intermediaries‖).
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consisting of information about the business, its financial situation, and the offering.272 Beyond the initial sale of securities,
the CROWDFUND Act creates a duty to provide investors and
the SEC an annual report of a similar level as the original filing.273 It is hard to say in advance how lengthy and detailed the
crowdfunding disclosures will be,274 but one thing is certain:
they will be only a tiny fraction as lengthy or detailed as the
disclosures found in the contemporary public company context.275 Crowdfunding disclosures will probably be short and
non-specific, and the crowd is likely to find as much information among themselves,276 or through their collective research,277 as will be disclosed by the companies.
For these reasons, mandatory disclosure will not be highly
relevant to addressing the trio of problems for crowdfunding.
2. Proxy Contests
Proxy contests address agency costs in public companies as
the possibility of being voted out by the shareholders helps
keep the board accountable in a manner akin to politicians.
Such elections are often routine affairs, where the outgoing
board nominates itself for another term and the shareholders
approve, but sometimes an insurgent group challenges the incumbent board to a contested election (a proxy contest)278
where the shareholders ultimately decide by majority vote.279
272. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1).
273. Id. § 77d-1(b)(4).
274. Cf. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,540 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239–40, 249) (estimating that the ―burden to prepare and file‖ a
crowdfunding issuer disclosure form would be approximately 60 hours).
275. It is also an open question whether digital shareholders will read or
understand these disclosures, in part because they will likely be investing only
a small amount of money in each company, rendering it irrational to spend
significant time and effort learning about each one. See generally OMRI BENSHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 6 (2014) (―Mandated disclosure is alluring, but it routinely fails to achieve its ambitious goals.‖); Florencia MarottaWurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of
the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165,
168 (2011) (reporting on empirical finding that less than 1% of users read end
user license agreements, or EULAs, for software sold online).
276. See infra Part IV.A.
277. See infra Part IV.B.
278. Public shareholders generally vote via written proxy. See Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 1477–79 (providing further background information on proxy
contests).
279. See, e.g., Julie Jargon et al., New Board Will Set Darden’s Menu—
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Proxy contests require a majority voting stake dispersed
among the public, yet very few crowdfunding entrepreneurs
will sell a majority of the voting shares to the crowd.280 Much
more commonly, the entrepreneur will maintain voting control
herself, making a proxy contest a mathematical impossibility.
Entrepreneurs will keep control to avoid the possibility of a
proxy contest and also to smooth the road for potential future
rounds of funding.281 Indeed, this author has suggested that
crowdfunding companies are likely to avoid selling any equity
at all to the crowd, instead offering them debt or other securities.282
To summarize: proxy contests will not be a relevant method for addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies because crowdfunded companies will rarely sell a majority of the
voting shares to the crowd.283
3. Takeovers
The threat of a takeover bid is widely viewed as among the
most important means of addressing agency costs in public
companies.284 It is unlikely to have the same effect for crowdfunding companies, however.
When corporate voting power is widely dispersed among
many shareholders, a third party can buy up 51% through a
tender offer, putting herself in position to select the board and
control the corporation. From the perspective of the incumbent
management, who commonly lose their positions, all of this is
generally seen as hostile, hence the term ―hostile takeover.‖
But management can avoid being taken over and replaced by
keeping the share price high and rising over the long run, the
upshot being that the threat of a takeover bid disciplines managers to put forth great effort to raise the share price, an outcome welcomed by shareholders.285
Activist Starboard Wins a Unique Victory, Replacing Restaurant Company’s
Entire Set of 12 Directors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2014, at B3 (reporting on a
successful proxy contest).
280. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1481–82.
281. See id. at 1481.
282. Id. at 1482–89.
283. In the (likely rare) case where a crowdfunding company does sell a
majority of the voting power, perhaps by allowing cumulative voting, a proxy
contest among the crowd may actually be more viable than in the public company context. Id. at 1477–79.
284. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965).
285. See id. at 112; see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF EN-
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The discipline of takeovers cannot be translated from traditional public companies to crowdfunded ones. As in the case
of proxy contests,286 most crowdfunded companies will likely
sell only a minority interest to the crowd, rendering a takeover
impossible.287 In addition, there will likely be only a very limited and illiquid secondary market for crowdfunded securities.288
4. Derivative Actions
Shareholder derivative actions play a significant role in responding to agency costs for public companies, but they are unlikely to hold the same import for crowdfunding companies.
Corporate officials owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
to their corporation, as elaborated in case law. These legal obligations should be, and generally are, taken seriously by such
officials. But if a ―corporate official violates any of the duties he
or she owes to the corporation, and the board of directors fails
to take appropriate action, American law recognizes the right of
a shareholder to sue in the corporation‘s behalf to redress the
injury.‖289 This type of lawsuit is called a ―derivative‖ action because the shareholder‘s capacity to sue the official derives from
the corporation. Similarly, any recovery in a derivative action
goes to the corporation. Shareholder-plaintiffs regularly file derivative actions against the directors and senior management
of traditional public companies, especially in certain situations,
such as mergers.290 Institutional shareholders may have
58 (1996) (oberving that threat of takeover helps keep corporate
management faithful to the corporation).
286. See supra Part III.C.2.
287. Again, in the (likely rare) case where a crowdfunding company does
sell a majority of the voting power, takeover bidders will apparently be free to
engage in at least some coercive tactics that would be unlawful were they attempted with registered securities as they would be unfettered by the Williams Act, the federal law that governs tender offers for registered securities.
See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1480.
288. Id. at 1463 (―[A]s a practical matter there will be a very small secondary market for any given crowdfunded security. This is simply because the
number of shares in the marketplace is likely to be orders of magnitude smaller for a crowdfunded issue than a registered one. Publicly traded companies
issue millions or even billions of shares, making it easy to find someone who
wants to buy or sell a few. Crowdfunded companies, by contrast, are likely to
have only thousands of securities outstanding, making it difficult and expensive to transact in them. For this reason, no liquid secondary market is likely
to develop in crowdfunded securities.‖).
289. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 207.
290. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in MerTERPRISE
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enough money at stake to make a derivative action sensible,
and plaintiff-side attorneys have strong incentives (i.e., fees
paid by the corporation) to bring such actions. In the public
company context, in short, derivative actions (including the
threat of them) help discipline corporate management to act as
faithful agents of the corporation.
In the crowdfunding context, shareholder derivative actions are likely to be of little use, simply because there will be
so much less money at stake. The shareholders will likely be
dispersed, each holding a few shares, making it economically
unreasonable for any one of them to spend their own time and
money bringing a derivative action that would benefit the corporation as a whole. And as for attorneys themselves, the fees
in public company derivative litigation regularly amount to
millions of dollars, so landing just a portion of such work can
maintain a practice.291 For crowdfunded companies, where the
maximum total fundraising allowed is $1 million, any attorneys‘ fees awarded in derivative litigation will surely amount to
only a fraction of that available in the traditional public company litigation.
Hence derivative litigation is not likely to be a consequential method of addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies.
5. Activist Shareholders
Traditionally, many public shareholders were widely dispersed, meaning that no single shareholder held enough of a
stake to make careful monitoring worthwhile.292 That may have
been true in the 1930s, but it no longer describes the contemporary world, where a small group of institutional investors hold
70% of outstanding stock in our major corporations, generally
on behalf of the ultimate beneficial owners.293 Most of these institutional investors are generally passive—but not all.
So-called ―activist‖ investors find a promising target, buy
up a large stake,294 and then present management with ideas
ger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 557, 557–59 (2015) (―Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%.‖).
291. See Adam B. Badawi & Daniel Chen, The Shareholder Wealth Effects
of Delaware Litigation (Sept. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://users
.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Delaware.pdf.
292. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 47–65.
293. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 123.
294. Id. at 900 n.123 (―The activist shareholder‘s predisclosure acquisition
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to raise the value of their shares.295 By monitoring and advising
management, activist investors can help reduce agency costs at
public companies. And if their concerns are not met, activists
can use hardball tactics, such as a proxy fight, to convince or
force management to accept their intervention.296
Activist investing will not be appropriate for crowdfunding.
First, there is not enough money involved. The model of activist
investing is that they need a large initial investment to give
them the economic motivation to engage a target and try to
raise its value.297 Yet the amounts at stake in crowdfunded
companies will likely be too small for activists to bother with.
The maximum amount a crowdfunding company can issue is $1
million, but the usual toeholds by public company activists are
many times that total amount. Second, there is unlikely to be
much of a secondary market for crowdfunded securities, and
definitely not one as deep and liquid as for traditional public
companies.298
In short, activist investing will not be a useful mechanism
for addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies.
6. Equity-Based Compensation
Public companies use equity-based compensation to address agency costs.299 Paying senior executives a significant
portion of their compensation in stock or stock options is designed to align the executives‘ personal interest with that of the
company as a whole.300 If the company becomes more valuable,
the stock price rises, and the executive‘s pay increases; if the
share price drops, her pay will decrease. The precise way in
of a significant toehold is critical to its business model.‖).
295. Id. at 896 (explaining that activists aim to ―identify strategic and governance shortfalls with significant valuation consequences, to acquire a position in a company with governance-related underperformance, and then to
present reticent institutions with their value proposition: a specified change in
the portfolio company‘s strategy or structure‖).
296. See, e.g., Jargon et al., supra note 279.
297. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 123, at 902–04 (describing the importance of a substantial ―toehold‖ investment).
298. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1463 (―[T]here will be a very small secondary market for any given crowdfunded security.‖); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d-1(e) (2012) (restricting the secondary market for crowdfunded securities).
299. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753–54
(2002).
300. This is very similar to the rationale for equity-based compensation in
the VC context. See supra Part III.A.4.
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which public companies use equity-based compensation varies
and is the subject of significant scholarly attention.301 How long
should the executive have to hold on to the stock?302 Should the
strike price ever be reset?303 For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that equity-based compensation is a widely
used technique among public companies to address agency
costs, and that there is a deep and well-established literature
on best practices in doing so.304
Even so, equity-based compensation will not translate well
to the crowdfunding context for the same reasons discussed in
Part III.A.4. Management will likely already hold most or all of
the equity in the company, meaning that any additional incentive from equity-based compensation will be modest.
7. Appraisal and Weinberger
Finally, appraisal and so-called Weinberger305 actions are
both important mechanisms for addressing agency costs in public companies. Indeed, ―appraisal arbitrage‖ has lately become a
darling among hedge funds, who buy up shares for the express
purpose of pursuing appraisal.306 And Weinberger cases continue to make headlines.307
Appraisal and Weinberger are both used to contain a controlling shareholder who might otherwise act opportunistically
toward the minority shareholders.308 For a variety of reasons,
301. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 209; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the
Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009).
302. E.g., Bhagat & Romano, supra note 301 (suggesting that executives be
forced to hold company stock for two to four years after leaving the firm).
303. Google famously reset employees‘ stock option strike price in 2009 after a 50% drop in the share price. See Martin Peers, Google’s Optional Windfall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2009, at C10.
304. See, e.g., David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?,
84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 697–708 (2004) (summarizing literature on equity-based
compensation).
305. Named after Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
306. See Liz Hoffman, Risky Legal Ploy Seeks to Milk Buyouts, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 2014, at C1 (reporting on the ―rise of ‗appraisal arbitrage,‘ in which
hedge funds buy shares of companies on the brink of a buyout and ask a judge
to award them a higher price‖).
307. E.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Judge Finds Chief of Dole Fraudulently
Drove Down Its Stock Price Before Buyout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2015, at B6
(reporting on a high-profile Weinberger action involving Dole Food Co. that resulted in a $148 million judgment against two individuals).
308. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705 (A ―majority shareholder . . . owe[s] a fiduciary responsibility to . . . [the] minority.‖).
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controlling shareholders commonly seek to eject the minority
shareholders without their consent through a so-called ―cashout merger,‖ the result of which is that the majority shareholder winds up with 100% of the shares, and the other shareholders end up with cash.309 A cash-out merger can be used equitably, but it can also be abused by a controlling shareholder that
tries to cash out the minority for a pittance. The law allows a
special remedy for shareholders who feel that the cash out price
they were offered was unfairly low: appraisal.310 An appraisal
action is a trial-like proceeding in which the court takes evidence and ultimately awards the shareholder the ―fair value‖ of
her shares.311 And for those who prefer, they can bring a Weinberger312-type action claiming that the majority violated its fiduciary duty by offering an unfair price or running an unfair
process.
The mere presence of appraisal and Weinberger helps discourage majority shareholders from cashing people out at an
unfairly low price in the first place. Can this translate from the
public company context to the crowdfunding context? Perhaps.
Digital shareholders clearly face a risk of being treated inequitably by a controlling shareholder, the situation to which appraisal and Weinberger relate.313 Appraisal and Weinberger respond directly to these sorts of issues314 and may prove useful
for digital shareholders.315 On the other hand, they may not be

309. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 215.
310. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015).
311. This amount may be higher or lower than the original cash-out offer.
Id.
312. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701.
313. See Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 612 (describing inter-shareholder conflict).
314. Another potentially relevant rule of corporate law is the line of doctrine holding that shareholders of closely held corporations owe each other fiduciary duties, whose seminal case is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
315. One might reasonably ask why the problem of an insufficient pool for
attorneys‘ fees will not pose a problem in the context of appraisal or Weinberger actions, when such a problem was previously discussed in connection
with derivative actions. See supra Part III.C.4. One answer is that appraisal
and Weinberger cases will generally arise among successful companies, including those that obtain venture capital or other sources of funding beyond the
crowd, meaning more money will be at stake. Also, the issue will be the fair
value of the shares, and that represents a unique opportunity for substantial
awards that is not similarly present in ordinary derivative actions, which may
relate to much smaller concerns with subsequently small damage awards.
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cost-effective for small startups where there is a relatively
small amount at stake.
In short, appraisal and Weinberger may be utilized by digital shareholders to address agency costs in crowdfunded companies, but these are relatively weak mechanisms.
This Part asked whether any of the traditional solutions
used by VCs, angels, and public shareholders to address the
three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance can be
applied to crowdfunding. It showed that most of the traditional
techniques, including the most powerful of them, hold little relevance for crowdfunding. As such, the next and final Part introduces a number of new and different methods—ones not currently in use by VCs, angels or public shareholders—that can
effectively address the three problems in the distinctive digital
context of crowdfunding.

IV. DIGITAL METHODS TO ADDRESS THE THREE
PROBLEMS IN CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding will take place in a lightly regulated316 digital space that is new and different from the familiar worlds of
VC, angels, and public companies, and thus needs new and additional responses to the fundamental problems of uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs. This Part proposes
for crowdfunding a set of novel solutions to the trio of problems;
novel in the sense that they are not currently employed in VC,
angel investing, or public companies. These proposed solutions
are all meant to suit the institutional context of crowdfunding,
where digital shareholders will interact with companies via the
Internet.317
316. The regulatory burden is light compared to traditional public offerings. It may not be light in an absolute sense, and numerous commentators
believe the regulatory obligations will be insurmountably high. See, e.g., Joan
MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale
of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a
Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 867 (2013–2014) (―The provisions of the
CROWDFUND Act . . . create a significant cost structure that is not likely to
be outweighed by the benefits of a crowdfunded offering conducted under the
Act . . . .‖); Hurt, supra note 16, at 252–54 (―Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed
Because Section 4(6) Is Too Costly and Burdensome on Issuers and Portals‖);
Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12, at 1605–06 (―[T]he regulatory costs
are likely to take too much of the small amount of money that can be raised.‖).
317. It must be acknowledged that ―the Internet‖ as we now understand it
could and probably will continue to change and evolve in unpredictable ways.
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These five mechanisms are presented in the rough chronological order of when each would be called upon in the life of a
crowdfunded company. The wisdom of the crowd (Part IV.A)
and the crowdsourcing of information (Part IV.B) will be most
relevant when a company launches a crowdfunding campaign
and potential investors are deciding whether to invest. Online
reputation (Part IV.C) and securities-based compensation (Part
IV.D) come into play both during the campaign and after the
company receives the money. Digital monitoring (Part IV.E) is
mainly important after the company receives the funds.
A. THE WISDOM OF THE CROWD
Investing in startups with no track record through online
crowdfunding presents tremendous uncertainty and information asymmetries for investors. How should a potential
crowdfunding investor pick which company to invest in? She
would like to invest in one that will succeed, yet she knows that
she cannot accurately predict how a set of startup companies
will turn out—and she is surely right on that score. But research has shown that large groups of people—crowds—can collectively do a pretty good job at forecasting the future, regardless of whether the crowd is rational or comprised of experts.318
This ―wisdom of the crowd‖ has a clear and important application to crowdfunding where it can be a powerful tool to address
both uncertainty and information asymmetry.
A well-established body of scientific literature shows that
groups are better at finding facts and making predictions than
lone individuals, even experts.319 Moreover, this phenomenon is
For example, there was a time when most people experienced the Internet
through browsers and the worldwide web; these days, smartphones and apps
have become the norm. Future changes to the Internet are likely and impossible to predict, so this Part does not intend to suggest an exhaustive list. Rather, other effective solutions, beyond those presented in this Part or presently
conceivable to this author, will likely arise as a ―[product] of human action, but
not the result of human design.‖ FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 7 (1948).
318. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xiii–xiv, 29–32 (―Even if most of the
people within a group are not especially well-informed or rational, it can still
reach a collectively wise decision.‖).
319. See, e.g., id. at 31–32 (―[A] large group of diverse individuals will come
up with better and more robust forecasts and make more intelligent decisions
than even the most skilled [individual acting alone].‖); Karsten Hueffer et al.,
The Wisdom of Crowds: Predicting a Weather and Climate-Related Event, 8
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 91, 91 (Mar. 2013). For crowdfunding, where
investors will have to gauge the future performance of various startup companies, predictions will be more important than fact-finding.
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enhanced when people have a financial stake in being right,320
as will be the case in crowdfunding. Because they will be risking their own money, potential investors will take the exercise
seriously.321
This wisdom of crowds can be seen in numerous fields.322
For one example, the Iowa Electronic Markets—an online futures market where traders buy and sell contracts whose payoffs depend on the outcome of elections and other events—have
been able to predict presidential and other elections more accurately than traditional polls.323 For another, consider the Nenana Ice Classic, an annual betting pool dating from 1917
where Alaskans try to predict the exact date and time when the
ice covering the Tanana River will break up, marking the start
of spring.324 It turns out that the average of all the participants‘
predictions is at least as accurate as any expert model in forecasting the ice break up.325 Many other examples of the wisdom
of the crowd could be given.
The wisdom of the crowd is not due to some mystical phenomenon or mental convergence, but rather a simple mathematical consequence of averaging.326 If one person guesses too
high and another too low, their average response is spot on.327
But the crowd is not necessarily wise; it depends on the crowd
being sufficiently diverse in terms of their knowledge, skills
and perspectives.328 A crowd of like-minded people will do no
better than an individual because they ―share the same expertise—and the same blindspots. . . . From a wisdom-of-crowds
perspective, it is as if you do not have a crowd.‖329
320. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET
FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING ix–x (2007).

MECHANISMS

321. See id.
322. See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 114.
323. Id. at 17–19.
324. Hueffer et al., supra note 319, at 92.
325. Id. at 93.
326. Richard P. Larrick et al., The Social Psychology of the Wisdom of
Crowds, in SOCIAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 227, 229 (Joachim I.
Krueger ed., 2012) (―Combining judgments takes individual imperfection and
smoothes the rough edges to isolate the collective‘s view of the truth. Or, to
put it more mathematically and mundanely, averaging cancels error.‖).
327. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 5 (explaining that aggregating
and averaging a group‘s individual guesses is likely to produce good results).
328. See Hueffer et al., supra note 319 (―[G]roups can be more accurate
than most individuals to the extent to which each group is diverse.‖). The relevant type of diversity is cognitive, not sociological. See SUROWIECKI, supra
note 114, at 183.
329. Larrick et al., supra note 326, at 231; see SUROWIECKI, supra note 114,
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A diverse crowd, by contrast, is a potent force for discovering hidden truths and forecasting uncertain outcomes. This
goes back to the reason why the wisdom of the crowd effect exists in the first place: averaging. Diverse people will make different mistakes, which in the aggregate will encircle the truth.
A homogenous crowd will all make the same mistakes, so even
their average answer will be off the mark. For instance, when
forecasting a given outcome, a crowd made up of optimists will
consistently overestimate it,330 but a group made up of optimists, pessimists, and realists will, on average, get close to the
truth.
Crowdfunding is well positioned to capitalize on the wisdom of crowds.331 Once it commences, crowdfunding will gather
together a large group of investors on Internet portals to collectively judge the prospects of the various startups seeking funding. Importantly, this crowd will likely be a diverse one for all
the reasons discussed above in Part I.B.2. It will include digital
shareholders of every age, ethnicity, gender, geography, etc.
Diversity of perspectives is the key to the success of the wisdom
of the crowd,332 and it should work well for crowdfunding.333
On crowdfunding portals, each investor will select the investments that seem most promising to her. Over time, as the
crowd of investors weighs in, some companies will prove popular with the crowd, others not so. The net effect will be a collective prediction of which investments opportunities are the most
attractive, like a stock exchange with no securities analysts, no
CNBC, and no Wall Street Journal.334 One might expect chaos
at 36–39 (discussing ―groupthink‖).
330. As a possible example, the Federal Reserve‘s forecast for economic
growth was significantly higher than the growth that eventuated in each of
the past five years. Dylan Matthews, This Graph Shows How Bad the Fed Is
at Predicting the Future, WONKBLOG (June 19, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/19/this-graph-shows-how-bad
-the-fed-is-at-predicting-the-future.
331. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12 (―Enthusiasts for crowdfunding stressed that Internet offerings would harness the ‗wisdom of the
crowds‘ to separate the good business plans from the deficient (or corrupt).‖).
332. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 183 (―I mean not sociological diversity but rather cognitive diversity.‖).
333. This is not a certainty. It is possible that the crowd that forms on
crowdfunding portals will be single-minded and foolish, rather than diverse
and wise, but the open nature of the form indicates that the latter is more likely.
334. Admittedly, this collective prediction will surely be imperfect and at
least some poor prospects will receive funding. The idea is merely that, on average, there is wisdom in the crowd‘s predictions.
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and anarchy, but the ―wisdom of the crowd‖ theory suggests
that digital shareholders will do a relatively good job at picking
winners.335
Few digital shareholders will be experts on any field in
which they might invest, but all of them will be able to add
something to the collective effort. Information, as Friedrich
Hayek famously explained, is not concentrated in some central
repository.336 Rather, the information needed to transact, build
companies and generate economic growth is splintered among
countless people, each of whom only holds a small piece of it.337
By coming together on crowdfunding portals, members of the
crowd will each contribute the piece that they have.
Admittedly, predicting how startup companies will perform
is more complex and open-ended than predicting who will win
an election338 or when the ice will break up.339 But the wisdom
of the crowd theory applies to complex questions too.340 A group
of online gamers were able to solve a complex problem in AIDS
research that had eluded scientists for years.341 A group of professionals in many fields were able to find a submarine that
had vanished without a trace.342 The crowd drafted an encyclopedia that stacks up with the best in the world.343 Thus, ―complexity is no bar‖ to the emergence of the wisdom of the
crowd.344 Moreover, the ultimate question in crowdfunding in335. Some commentators expect that crowdfunding investors will have only
poor investments to choose from because no high-quality companies will
choose to employ crowdfunding. E.g., Dorff, supra note 14, at 520. If these critics are correct, the only good decision for the crowd would be to abandon the
market entirely, rather than try to pick among the offerings. Still, that would
be a good decision and one that can be made with the help of the crowd.
336. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 241, at 524 (discussing the difficulty of
concentrating statistical information in the hands of central planners).
337. See id. at 526 (describing how even diffuse information will eventually
lead to the same outcome as if that information was held by one person).
338. See supra text accompanying note 323.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 324–25.
340. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xvii.
341. Firas Khatib et al., Crystal Structure of a Monomeric Retroviral Protease Solved by Protein Folding Game Players, 18 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1175, 1177 (2011).
342. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xx.
343. Aniket Kittur & Robert E. Kraut, Harnessing the Wisdom of Crowds
in Wikipedia: Quality Through Coordination, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008
ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 37, 45
(2008) (―Wikipedia is both an existence proof and a model for how complex
cognitive tasks with high coordination requirements can be effectively
achieved through distributed methods.‖).
344. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xvii.
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vesting is binary—buy or pass—so while the considerations are
complex, the ultimate answer is either zero or one.
Certain aspects of the CROWDFUND Act are specifically
designed to enhance the wisdom of the crowd effect. First, the
Act provides that only those offerings that meet a predetermined goal will actually get funded; for those that fall short, all
the pledged investments will be nullified.345 Second, the Act
gives investors the right to cancel a commitment to invest once
made.346 The effect of both of these provisions will be that any
individual investor who selects a ―bad‖—meaning unpopular—
investment will be saved from her poor choice by the wisdom of
the crowd. She will not walk off the cliff alone, but will be
pulled back to safety by the crowd.
The wisdom of the crowd will benefit crowdfunding entrepreneurs as well as investors. A startup that may appear unpromising to venture capitalists, angel investors and other traditional sources of startup funding might catch the eye of a few
members of the crowd. Due to the large size and heterogeneity
of digital shareholders, ―the chances that at least someone will
take a gamble on a radical or unlikely idea obviously increases.‖347 There may be lots of welfare-enhancing companies that
can grow through crowdfunding whose promise would only be
recognized by a relatively few people who happen to hold the
relevant information, and the odds are much greater to find
them among the crowd rather than accredited investors. For
example, a company that wanted to sell specialized cleats for
ultimate would need to find those pockets of players who recognize that this is an unmet consumer desire.348
In conclusion, the wisdom of the crowd can help address
both uncertainty and information asymmetry in the crowdfunding context.
B. CROWDSOURCED INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
Beyond the tacit collaboration of the wisdom of the crowd,
potential investors can share what they know on the Internet
for others to see, add to and comment upon. Using online cha345. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012).
346. Id. This right is expressly implemented at 15 C.F.R. § 237.304(a) in
the regulations. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,558 (proposed Nov. 15,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 227.304(a)).
347. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 29.
348. See generally What is Ultimate?, USA ULTIMATE, http://www
.usaultimate.org/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
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trooms, bulletin boards and the like, potential investors and
others can directly communicate with one another and share
material information about various crowdfunding investments.349 This type of crowdsourcing350 holds great promise as
a response to uncertainty and information asymmetry in
crowdfunding, and its use has been endorsed by the SEC.351
Crowdsourcing is a voluntary online activity that ―leverages the collective intelligence of online communities‖ to achieve a
concrete result.352 Wikipedia is a crowdsourced encyclopedia
that has proven about as reliable as other leading encyclopedias.353 NASA uses crowdsourcing to sort through millions of photographs taken from space, on the theory that someone familiar
with a given locale could easily identify it, whereas few others,
nor computers, could readily do so.354 Other examples abound,
including less formal structures like chat groups,355 email lists,
blogs and other online communities where people gather and
share information on a sports team, pet breed, or any other
349. See BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 12–13. This is analogous to the practice of syndication, or group investing, which allows VC investors to ―obtain
each other‘s judgment with respect to particular investment opportunities.‖
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 56.
350. See generally BRABHAM, supra note 31; Jeff Howe, The Rise of
Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176 (origin of the term). The present
Article uses ―crowdsourcing‖ in a loose sense. See JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS
280 (2008) (loosely defining crowdsourcing as ―an umbrella term for a highly
varied group of approaches that share one obvious attribute in common: they
all depend on some contribution from the crowd‖); Lee Anne Fennell,
Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 385 n.2 (2013) (using the
term in a ―loose manner‖). For instance, Yochai Benkler‘s concept of ―commons-based peer production‖ comes within this Article‘s conception of
crowdsourcing. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of
the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002). This is as opposed to the strict definitions suggested by some in the literature which would exclude Wikipedia and
other projects that are popularly conceived as crowdsourced. E.g., BRABHAM,
supra note 31, at 2–3, 7–8 (expressly excluding Benkler‘s idea from a formal
definition of crowdsourcing).
351. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430 (describing the sharing of
information as one of the ―central tenets‖ of crowdfunding).
352. BRABHAM, supra note 31, at xix.
353. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE
900, 901 (2005) (finding that Wikipedia is nearly as accurate as the Encyclopædia Britannica, at least with regard to scientific articles).
354. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Image Overload: Help Us Sort It All Out,
NASA Requests, CNN (Aug. 18, 2014, 8:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/
17/tech/nasa-earth-images-help-needed.
355. By this I mean an online bulletin board where people can post messages and reply to those previously posted.
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subject.356
These sorts of efforts translate well to crowdfunding. Just
as thousands of people contribute to Wikipedia and perform
other crowdsourced work for free, potential investors can investigate companies and share their findings with the crowd.357
Difficult implementation questions need to be worked out, such
as whether participants would have to register with their real
names, or if anonymous posting would be allowed.358
As for expertise, few potential investors will be experts in a
formal sense,359 but some surely will. Among a large enough
crowd, there is sure to be somebody with expertise in any given
field, simply as a matter of numbers.360 Moreover, there are at
least some companies that may seek to use crowdfunding that
already have an online community of customers or users who
are especially knowledgeable about that company.361 If any of
these types of experts share their knowledge on the bulletin
board, then the whole crowd can become well informed.362
More important than formal expertise, however, is the idea
that practically every member of the crowd knows something
that others do not; something particular to their personal experience, skills, and perspective.363 Each of these distributed bits
356. See, e.g., THE BEST RAT TERRIER SITE ON THE WEB, http://www.rat
-terrier.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
357. This already happens in related spaces, such as peer-to-peer lending.
See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2011).
358. Anonymity might enhance the accuracy of the discussion in some cases, but it may also diminish it in others. See BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 13
(―Anonymity is important for online collaboration, especially when people express ideas and opinions to a commons.‖).
359. See supra Part I.B.2.
360. See Dorff, supra note 14 (―Some crowdfunders may have relevant experience . . . .‖).
361. Nut-butter company, Justin‘s, for instance, has received over 120,000
likes on Facebook. Justin’s, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
JustinsNutButter (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Presumably, many of these fans
are intimately familiar with the company‘s products. See also Leslie Josephs,
Nut-Butter Firm’s Founder Adjusts to Growth, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2015, at
B5 (reporting that early fundraisings for the company were on the order of
$25,000 to $100,000, which would have been appropriate for securities crowdfunding, had it existed at the time).
362. There is reason to expect that they will do so. See infra text accompanying notes 364–88.
363. Hayek, supra note 241, at 519 (―[S]cientific knowledge is not the sum
of all knowledge. . . . [T]here is beyond question [another] body of very important but unorganized knowledge[,] . . . the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every
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of information standing alone may not be significant. But gathered together, they constitute a sort of collective wisdom on just
about any subject that may arise.
Indeed, the SEC‘s Regulation Crowdfunding envisions
crowdsourced investor research of this sort: ―Individuals interested in the crowdfunding campaign—members of the ‗crowd‘—
may share information about the project, cause, idea or business with each other and use the information to decide whether
or not to fund the campaign based on the collective ‗wisdom of
the crowd.‘‖364 Moreover, the regulation specifically authorizes
funding portals to ―[p]rovide communication channels by which
investors can communicate with one another and with representatives of the issuer through the funding portal‘s platform
about offerings through the platform,‖ subject to certain conditions, including public access.365
But is this realistic? Why would someone with good information about a given investment post it on a bulletin board and
share it with other members of the crowd for free? Securities
analysts and hedge funds, who play an analogous role for traditional public companies, tend keep their findings and opinions
secret or share them only with a limited number of clients or
other parties.366
Apart from altruism, a desire for fame, or other nonpecuniary reasons,367 is there an economic rationale for digital shareholders to share information with one another? Yes there is,
one that comes directly from the interplay of two components of
individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made . . . .‖).
364. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239–40, 249). This already happens with respect to publicly traded
companies, as hedge funds and others use blogs, Twitter and other online forums to ―talk their book.‖ See, e.g., Steven Russolillo, The iCahn Effect: Apple’s
Market Cap Jumps by $17 Billion After Tweets, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT
(Aug. 13, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/08/13/the
-icahn-effect-apples-market-cap-jumps-by-17-billion-after-tweets (―Activist investor Carl Icahn disclosed on Twitter Tuesday afternoon a ‗large position‘ in
Apple Inc., the tech giant which he deemed ‗extremely undervalued.‘ . . . Apple
shares jumped on the news, rising as much as 5.8%. . . . From the moment
that Icahn tweeted through Tuesday‘s intraday high, Apple had gained $17.1
billion in market value . . . .‖).
365. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,560.
366. See David Benoit, Hedge Funds Learn Secrets Not So Safe, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 26, 2015, at C1 (―In the hedge-fund world, there is no more closely
guarded secret than what stock a firm is preparing to target.‖).
367. See generally Schwartz, supra note 126 (describing the non-monetary
rewards of participating in crowdfunding).
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crowdfunding, at least as conceived by the federal JOBS Act.
First, each crowdfunding investor faces an annual cap of
5% of their income or net worth in all crowdfunded securities
each year.368 For most Americans, this works out to be somewhere between $2500 and $5000 per year in all crowdfunded
investments.369 Second, crowdfunding companies must announce their fundraising goal in advance and will only receive
the money if they reach or exceed that goal.370
The combined effect of these two rules is that a potential
investor who spots a great opportunity has a powerful economic
incentive to share her views widely. The investment cap prevents a single investor from funding a company on her own.371
If she keeps her information secret and the company does not
catch the attention of other investors, it will not reach its goal
and no securities will be sold. By contrast, if such an investor
shares her information on the Internet, it is more likely that
the issuer will reach its goal and she will get the securities she
wants. In short, crowdfunding promotes cooperation. Those
with valuable information about crowdfunding companies have
a powerful incentive to give that information away, including
on an Internet bulletin board.372
Furthermore, reputation feedback systems of the sort discussed in the next Section could enhance the efficacy of

368. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). Wealthy investors can invest up to
10%. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
369. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1461.
370. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7).
371. There are extreme circumstances where this might not hold and a single investor could fund an entire issuance. Because the CROWDFUND Act allows those with an income or net worth over $100,000 to invest 10%, up to an
absolute limit of $100,000, there is the possibility that a single person could
buy up a huge chunk, even 100%, of the crowdfunded securities from a given
company. This appears to be an unlikely scenario.
372. A similar sort of platform, called SumZero, already exists for professional investment analysts to share their proprietary investment reports with
one another in an online forum. See About SumZero, SUMZERO, https://
sumzero.com/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (claiming to have ―more than
12,000 pre-screened professionals‖); Sum of Its Parts: Web Site Combines Idea
Database, Networking, FINALTERNATIVES (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www
.finalternatives.com/node/7348 (―A new Web site is seeking to combine two of
the more revolutionary and successful ideas in recent Internet history, Wikipedia and social networking, for the benefit of the buyside community.‖). A
key difference between SumZero and crowdsourced investment analysis is that
the former is an exclusive network only open to professionals whose applications are accepted, whereas crowdsourced investment analysis for crowdfunding will be open to all.
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crowdsourced investment analysis.373 Commenters could receive votes and build up reputations for the value of their comments, which would improve the system.374
One potential problem with crowdsourced investment information is that it might give rise to market manipulation. For
instance, the issuer could ask a friend (or set of friends) to post
false information in order to obtain the initial investment.
Simple fraud like this is surely possible, but it seems unlikely
to develop into a major problem because the gravity of the consequences and the chances of detection are both relatively high,
while the potential returns are rather modest. The CROWDFUND Act has powerful anti-fraud provisions,375 and it also
empowers state authorities as well as jilted investors376 to sue
issuers and other parties who engage in wrongdoing such as
this. Furthermore, everyone who posts information will be
logged in, making it a cinch to track down who said what. Given all this, it seems that issuers with fraudulent intentions
would have better luck elsewhere.
Manipulation by third parties in the secondary market will
be even less of a concern. Consider the example of the pumpand-dump scheme where stockholders circulate market-moving
but false information to drive up the price of their shares, and
then sell and book profits before the truth comes out. Such manipulation requires a secondary market of substantial size to
make it worthwhile, but that will not generally be the case for
crowdfunded companies. For one thing, the JOBS Act expressly
prohibits a secondary market for a year after issuance.377 Even
after that, the number of shares available will generally be too
small to make practical a secondary market.378
373. See infra Part IV.C.2.
374. SumZero explicitly incorporates the concept of reputation. See About
SumZero, supra note 372 (―[T]he platform . . . enables members to build a
track record . . . .‖).
375. The regulations contemplate incorporating already-existing anti-fraud
measures and requires intermediaries to comply with specific, additional
measures. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,556 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 227.301).
376. State regulators can disqualify issuers for misconduct, id. at 66,562,
and the statute includes a private right of action, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2012).
377. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e).
378. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1463 (―[A]s a practical matter there will
be a very small secondary market for any given crowdfunded security.‖); id.
(―[N]o liquid secondary market is likely to develop in crowdfunded securities.‖).
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Finally, putting intentional manipulation aside, there is
also the possibility that, instead of being wise and thoughtful,
the crowd could act with a mob or herd mentality of the sort
that has led to asset bubbles from the Dutch Tulips of the seventeenth century to the housing bubble of our own. By communicating with one another on the Internet, the crowd could
suffer from ―groupthink‖ thanks to issues like anchoring379 or
information cascades.380 Anyone who has ever chosen a restaurant simply because it is crowded understands the concept of
an information cascade. The restaurant might be crowded because it is high quality; alternatively, it might be low-quality
and the initial diners simply made a mistake that many others
followed.381
Anchoring and information cascades like this could undermine the effectiveness of crowdsourcing investor information.
For instance, if enough people on an Internet chat board seem
to think the investment is a good one, others might latch on to
the popularity of that view and adopt it as their own, regardless of its underlying merit. This ―lemming problem‖382 can already be observed in reward crowdfunding, where popular projects appear to take off once they hit a certain level of
funding.383
Fortunately, there is good reason to think that anchoring
and information cascades will not be fatal in the context of
crowdfunding because investors are likely to feel and act independent from one another. Research shows that groups of people are ―far more likely to come up with a good decision if the
people in the group are independent of each other.‖384 Independence is important because ―it keeps the mistakes that peo379. ―When people are asked to generate an estimate, they frequently anchor on an obvious or convenient number . . . and then adjust upward or
downward . . . . This procedure naturally leads to estimations which are
skewed toward the initial value.‖ Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 630, 667 (1999).
380. An information cascade is a herding-like effect where people disregard
their own private information and adopt the popular view if they observe sufficiently many other people taking that view. See CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA
88–91 (2006); SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 53–55.
381. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 54–55.
382. I credit Seth Oranburg with coining this term.
383. See Agrawal et al., supra note 222, at 13 (―[I]nvestors‘ propensity to
invest in a given week increases as the entrepreneur visibly accumulates capital on the site.‖).
384. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 41.
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ple make from becoming correlated‖ and because ―independent
individuals are more likely to have new information.‖385
On crowdfunding websites, there will be no institutional
investors to set the tone with their gravitas, and while accredited investors will be invited, they will be on the same level as
everyone else. Furthermore, people on the Internet tend to act
individualistically and are willing to challenge one another.386
Finally, the lack of face-to-face contact in crowdfunding may
reduce the likelihood of the sort of mimicry that is found among
groups of animals and people.387 None of this ensures that
members of the crowd will act independently from one another,388 but it does enhance that possibility.
In sum, crowdsourced investor information is a promising
method for crowdfunding to address the fundamental problems
of uncertainty and information asymmetry, yet anchoring and
information cascades may hinder this mechanism.
C. ONLINE REPUTATION
The online reputation of founders, promoters, and managers of crowdfunded companies can be used to address both information asymmetry and agency costs in a manner well suited
to crowdfunding‘s institutional context. Insiders can signal to
investors that they are committed to and believe in the company by putting their online reputation on the line by, for instance, linking to their Facebook or other social media page on
their crowdfunding campaign.389 This reduces information
asymmetry. Furthermore, by putting their online reputation in
play, insiders can provide a bond—a credible promise—that
agency costs will be modest (i.e., they will work diligently and
faithfully for the investors‘ benefit).
Reputation is a summary or representation of society‘s
opinion of an individual or organization.390 Once such infor385. Id.
386. See id. at 42.
387. See id. at 43 (describing a psychology experiment involving a group of
people on a street corner looking up at nothing).
388. In particular, if certain members of the crowd are perceived as experts, see supra Part IV.B, others may follow their advice rather than rendering an independent analysis.
389. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1472 (―There is every reason to believe
that crowdfunding issuers and intermediaries can and will use Facebook or
other types of social media to promote their offerings to a wide audience at low
cost.‖).
390. See LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 31 (2007);
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mation is aggregated, reputations ―can help other community
members make decisions with respect to whether and how to
relate to that individual,‖ such as whether to trust them.391 In
this way, reputations ―create[] powerful incentives for good behavior.‖392 Furthermore, the Internet is well suited to keeping
careful track of one‘s reputation.393 The upshot is that online
reputation represents a promising method for addressing information asymmetry and agency costs in the crowdfunding
context.
Reputation is extremely useful in enabling successful interactions between transacting parties, such as buyers and
sellers.394 The existence of a reputation ―informs others about
[a seller‘s] abilities and dispositions,‖ and can be used to select
trustworthy counterparties.395 Reputation can also be a powerful disincentive for bad behavior. Since a good reputation enables business transactions, it is implicit that a bad reputation
would discourage business transactions.396 ―By ensuring that
people are accountable for their actions, reputation gives people
a strong incentive to conform to social norms and to avoid
breaching people‘s trust.‖397 This is why sellers care about having a good reputation. Thanks to reputational constraints,
―both individuals and organizations feel a lot of pressure to follow the group norms.‖398 In this way, reputation encourages
good behavior.399
In the context of crowdfunding, where all transactions will
take place on the Internet, online reputation will likely prove to
be an important way to address information asymmetry and
Chris Stiff, Are They Bothered? How the Opportunity To Damage a Partner’s
Reputation Influences Giving Behavior in a Trust Game, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
609, 610 (2008) (defining reputation as ―an aggregation of socially shared information regarding a potential interaction partner‖).
391. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social
Web, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY 4 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds.,
2011); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 31 (2007).
392. Gail L. Rein, A Reference Model for Designing Effective Reputation Information Systems, 31 J. INFO. SCI. 365, 365 (2005).
393. See id. at 375 (―Time Stamp records the precise time (year, month,
day, minute, and second) of the reputation rating.‖).
394. See id. at 365.
395. Id. at 365–66.
396. See SOLOVE, supra note 391.
397. Id. at 32; see id. at 31 (―In many circumstances, we look to people‘s
reputation to decide whether to trust them.‖).
398. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS 9 (2012).
399. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 8
(2013).
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agency costs. Scholars of privacy law have shown that living in
the Internet age makes it effectively impossible to remain
anonymous, which is itself a key factor in allowing for misbehavior.400 For example, studies have shown that drivers engage
in more misbehavior on the road when they feel anonymous401:
Drivers of convertibles drive less aggressively when they have
the top down;402 commercial drivers with ―How‘s My Driving?‖
stickers drive much more safely than those without.403
Internet-based securities crowdfunding will not be anonymous,404 making the institutional context of crowdfunding very
different from the conditions that led the enactment of state
Blue Sky Laws in the early 1900s and the federal securities
laws in the 1930s, when aggressive salesmen and con artists
roamed the land.405 These men used aliases and tended to ―fly
by night‖ from one town to the next, making reputation an ineffective means of constraining their behavior.406
With regard to securities crowdfunding, the social circumstances are very different. Entrepreneurs, investors, and management will all be identifiable, for it is the nature of the Internet that all parties must create a user name and password, link
a bank account, etc., before transacting business online,407
400. See SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 33 (―No longer can people hide in obscurity and escape accountability for their actions.‖); id. (―The Internet . . .
makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades. It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than a
second.‖).
401. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1705 (2006).
402. See id. at 1705–06 n.13.
403. See id. at 1711.
404. While some online marketplaces or activities may be anonymous, Internet-based securities crowdfunding will not be. Investors will be required to
link banking and other financial information to their online account.
405. See generally DAVID W. MAURER, THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF THE
CONFIDENCE MAN (1940) (documenting the practices of American con artists
in the early 1900s); AMY READING, THE MARK INSIDE: A PERFECT SWINDLE, A
CUNNING REVENGE, AND A SMALL HISTORY OF THE BIG CON (2012) (presenting
a history of con artist crime in the early 1900s); THE SECURITY MARKETS:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND 566–69 (Alfred L. Bernheim & Margaret Grant Schneider
eds., 1935) (explaining how the problems posed by dishonest securities traders
instigated securities laws in the early 1930s).
406. See SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 141 (―When people can avoid being
identified, they can slip away from their bad reputations.‖).
407. Cf. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 227.402(b)(4)(iii)) (requiring that participants in online chatrooms register
with the hosting portal). In contrast, other online marketplaces, such as
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thereby allowing every action and utterance to be monitored
and tracked.408 Even sophisticated Internet users who take
pains to anonymize and conceal their activity can generally be
found by determined detectives.409 The indelible data trail tying
a person to their online activity will give rise to an important
method for ameliorating information asymmetry and agency
costs by placing the online reputation of the promoters, directors and executives at stake.410
Online reputation will act as a signal of good companies as
well as a bonding mechanism to help ensure hard work and fidelity from the managers.411 With their personal reputation on
the line, managers of crowdfunded companies will have a
strong incentive to act in the shareholders‘ interest. This is
analogous to the traditional requirement that the incorporators
be listed on the certificate of incorporation,412 thus allowing potential investors to see who is behind the company (and whose
reputation should suffer if the company squanders their investments). This may have made sense when investors and directors knew each other from face-to-face interaction, but in the
modern world people earn and maintain their reputation
through their online presence.
This can all be seen as one instance of a larger ―reputation
revolution‖ whereby ―the anonymity and pseudonymity that
once characterized our interactions with strangers is fading.‖413
This revolution is playing out in many spheres, including concraigslist, may be more prone to fraud and other forms of misbehavior because
they permit anonymous communications with no clear link to a real person,
physical address, bank account, etc.
408. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 131 (1999) (explaining
that by ―using credit cards and checks (as opposed to paying cash) and [by] ordering merchandise over the phone and the Internet (rather than shopping in
person),‖ people ―leave data trails that are difficult to erase or conceal‖).
409. See Matthew Dalton & Andrew Grossman, Arrests Signal Breach in
“Darknet,” WALL ST. J., Nov. 8–9, 2014, at B1 (reporting that law enforcement
authorities ―shut dozens of illegal websites and arrested some operators‖ by
―piercing the anonymity offered by Tor, a network that relies on encryption
tools and 1,000s of servers to mask online activities‖).
410. But see Hurt, supra note 16, at 252 (―‗[L]eaving town‘ with fools‘ money is easier when there is no town.‖).
411. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153 (defining all efforts
to address agency costs as either monitoring by principals or bonding by
agents).
412. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(5) (2015) (mandating that a certificate of incorporation must include the ―name and mailing address of the
incorporator or incorporators‖).
413. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670–71 (2008).
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sumer contracting,414 and the ideas presented here are in accord with this larger phenomenon. One manifestation of this
phenomenon is the suggestion that there be a ―right to be forgotten‖ on the Internet, which has been recognized in Europe
but pointedly denied in the United States.415
On the whole, online reputation should work well to address information asymmetry and agency costs in the crowdfunding context. There are limits, however, including an inability of the crowd to detect shirking that does not lead to
disastrous results. If the company does fine, but could have
done great, the entrepreneur is unlikely to pay a reputational
fine. As such, reputation may be more effective at addressing
malfeasance than slacking.
Online reputation can be thought of in two senses, informal
and formal. The former refers to the amalgamation of all Internet references to a person, including blog posts, social media,
and everything else. The latter refers to reputation feedback
systems, such as the ―star‖ ratings used on Amazon and eBay.
The role that each type of online reputation may play in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs in crowdfunding
is considered in the following two subsections.
1. Disaggregated Online Reputation416
The management of crowdfunded companies can be disciplined by the prospect that if they shirk, provide themselves
with excessive compensation, or otherwise impose agency costs
on their investors, they will be pilloried in the ―blogosphere‖
and their online reputation will suffer.417 The management of
414. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality:
The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 702 (2012) (citing
Strahilevitz, supra note 401, and Strahilevitz, supra note 413).
415. Compare Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, at 88 (May 13, 2014) (Court of
Justice of the European Union recognizing a ―right to be forgotten‖), with Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right To Be Forgotten To Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 355 (2015)
(explaining that the European Union‘s ―right to be forgotten‖ has ―failed to develop under United States law‖ because it is ―antithetical to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution‖).
416. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) (exploring and discussing the
implications of emerging online technologies on privacy and public profile).
417. Cf. Hamermesh & Tsoflias, supra note 130, at 485 (―[I]f you commit
fraud on [an online investment portal], your whole social network is going to
know about it. Your future employers will know about it when they check your
Facebook page. That cute girl you met in the bar is going to know about it
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crowdfunding companies will be relatively easy to track down
because all activity will take place on the Internet, where they
will create a digital record and a trail to their door.418 The prospect of a sullied online reputation can help reduce the agency
costs of crowdfunding by disciplining management to act in the
shareholders‘ interest. This sort of discipline already takes
place in public markets, where activist shareholders employ social media to criticize and influence corporate management.419
More relevant for present purposes, online reputation is
widely used to discipline people who engage in reward crowdfunding.420 Kickstarter specifically warns users that
―[l]aunching a Kickstarter is a very public act, and creators put
their reputations at risk when they do.‖421 In one recent case,
apparel company Radiate Athletics raised substantial funds on
Kickstarter but then was overwhelmed by orders and fell badly
behind schedule, leading many disappointed patrons to complain on the Internet.422 ―The problem mushroomed into a public relations fiasco after angry Kickstarter backers, [sic] posted
complaints on Facebook, Twitter and other websites. In the
past 30 days alone, nearly 250 messages about Radiate have
been posted on Twitter, nearly all complaints . . . .‖423
Moreover, it seems likely that some promoters of crowdfunding companies will provide hyperlinks in their offering to
their Facebook, LinkedIn or other social media account as both
a signal and a bonding mechanism. Such a hyperlink effectively
says to investors, ―You can trust and expect that I will act responsibly with your investment, because the good name of my
digital persona hangs in the balance.‖ This method of linking to
social media is already used in reward crowdfunding; on Indiegogo, for instance, people seeking funding can obtain a ―Veriwhen you and she ‗friend‘ each other on Facebook. Your entire life on Facebook, which occurs in public, is now linked to your securities offering.‖ (quoting Professor Robert Miller)).
418. See id.
419. See Kristyn Hyland, Activist Investors Increasingly Use Social Media
To Further Their Causes, BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014), http://
www.bna.com/activist-investors-increasingly-n17179910807.
420. See, e.g., Angus Loten, Kickstarter Push Overwhelms Entrepreneur,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2014, at B5 (reporting about how an entrepreneur‘s
reputation suffered after he was unable to give promised rewards to his Kickstarter investors).
421. Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
422. Loten, supra note 420.
423. Id.
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fied Facebook Badge‖ by linking their Facebook and Indiegogo
account.424 The purpose, according to Indiegogo, is to reduce information asymmetry: ―We think it‘s useful to have information
that you may find helpful as you decide who to interact with on
Indiegogo. . . . These additional pieces of information can help
inform contributors‘ decisions about contributing to a campaign
on Indiegogo.‖425
It is certainly true, as some privacy scholars emphasize,
that there are downsides to this method of addressing the three
problems of investing.426 Their valid concerns over so-called
―Internet shaming‖ include a lack of due process and the prospect of vigilantism.427 Yet even critics acknowledge that ―Internet shaming has many benefits,‖ and are apparently most
opposed to the practice when it is used for violations of
norms.428 Yet in crowdfunding, legal obligations such as fiduciary duties and contractual covenants will be at stake.
2. Reputation Feedback Systems
Separate from the broad Internet-wide reputation of a person, digital shareholders may benefit from a crowdfundingspecific ―reputation feedback system,‖ akin to the star system
used on eBay or Amazon.429 A reputation feedback system is an
online mechanism where ―users of a network provide feedback
about the performance of other network members‖ that is compiled and presented for the benefit of future users.430 Reputation feedback systems are crucial to the functioning of online
marketplaces and may even be ―among the most important
forms of social production to emerge in the last decade.‖431
Most reputation feedback systems use what are called
―Likert-type‖ scales.432 Such scales allow respondents to rate
424. About Verifications, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en
-us/articles/202179638-About-Verifications (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
425. Id.
426. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 94–102 (identifying some
problems posed by Internet shaming).
427. See id. at 96–101.
428. See id. at 92.
429. See, e.g., About Comments, Feedback, & Ratings, AMAZON, http://
www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=537806 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2015).
430. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 131 (2007).
431. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472,
1506 (2007).
432. Dawn G. Gregg, Outline Reputation Scores: How Well Are They Un-
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their experience on a discrete scale (e.g., rating a seller one,
two, or three).433 Reputation feedback systems then aggregate
these ratings in some way and publicize the result.434 Many
reputation feedback systems display textual comments as
well.435
Reputation feedback systems translate the benefits of reputation in traditional marketplaces to online marketplaces.
Thus, they perform three main functions: they encourage consumers to partake in internet transactions despite risk and the
possibility of fraud, they decrease the risk and likelihood of
fraud associated with anonymous interactions, and they allow
consumers to have trust not only in their specific business
partner, but also in the marketplace as a whole. Since reputation feedback systems help consumers decide whom to trust in
online market places, consumers would theoretically avoid
those sellers which were more likely to put them at risk based
on their past behavior. As a result, sellers would try to avoid
having a bad reputation in these feedback systems so as to
avoid not being able to do business.
The reputation feedback systems currently in use can be
adapted for use in the crowdfunding arena.436 For instance, investors could be asked to rate their level of satisfaction with the
investment with one to five ―stars‖ at launch and, perhaps, annually thereafter. Over time, companies with low scores will
find it hard to garner interest from the crowd for future rounds
of fundraising. This all has the beneficial effect of encouraging
good behavior by managers, and some level of monitoring by
portals.437 Moreover, systems like these have extremely low
costs—a key concern for crowdfunding—especially because they
can be easily scaled. Finally, the SEC appears to have authority under the JOBS Act to require or recommend the use of reputation feedback systems as a way to protect investors.438
A linchpin of reputation feedback systems is having repeat
players.439 They work well on eBay or Amazon, where sellers
derstood?, 50 J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS. 90, 91 (2009).
433. See id.
434. See id.
435. See About Comments, Feedback, & Ratings, supra note 429.
436. See Tomboc, supra note 14, at 270.
437. The system is not perfect, of course, as many crowdfunding companies
will not have any future rounds of fundraising. In particular, the most problematic companies may never be heard from again.
438. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a) (2012).
439. See generally Gilson, supra note 17, at 1086 (stating that anticipating
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make many sales and want to maintain a high reputation score
to ensure future business. But many, perhaps most, crowdfunding companies will be one-time players, seeking funding just
once and never returning to the crowdfunding market. For such
companies, a reputation feedback system will likely not be of
much use, at least not beyond the broad reputation effects discussed in the previous subsection.
There is, however, at least one repeat player in the crowdfunding marketplace: the funding portals and broker-dealers
through which every transaction must be made. These intermediaries want investors to have a good experience so they will
return to invest again on their website, making them sensitive
to a reputation feedback system. A funding portal with lots of
poorly rated companies will find it difficult to attract future users to its site. Importantly, this appears to be an effective constraint for existing reward crowdfunding sites, such as Indiegogo, which take care to avoid having their markets overrun by
malfeasance.440 A reputation feedback system that allowed for
comparison between platforms could play a useful role in addressing the agency costs of crowdfunding, but the simple flow
of business may be sufficient even without such a system.
Finally, another set of repeat players is the entrepreneurs
and promoters behind the startups seeking funding. An entrepreneur that successfully finances one startup through crowdfunding may well be back months or years later to seek funding
for another startup. This phenomenon of serial entrepreneurship is common in the context of VC and angel investing,441 and
if it were to carry over to crowdfunding there would exist a set
of people who are repeat players with a strong interest in maintaining a good online reputation.
To summarize this Section, the importance in the modern
world of maintaining a good online reputation can be used to
reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs in crowdfunding.

repeated future transactions is an attribute in the operation of reputation
markets).
440. See supra text accompanying note 11.
441. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs
and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2312 (2005)
(―The owner-operator‘s human capital is not tied to any particular business
enterprise; it can be redeployed when opportunities outside the existing enterprise are more attractive than those inside, which is precisely why most entrepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs.‖).
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D. SECURITIES-BASED COMPENSATION
Although it is sometimes called ―equity crowdfunding,‖
startups will be allowed to sell any type of security they wish,
not just equity or common stock.442 Furthermore, there is good
reason to expect that many crowdfunding companies will sell a
variety of other types of securities, including unusual variants
that will be unfamiliar to potential investors, such as ―unequity‖443 or ―safe.‖444
The use of strange securities will create information
asymmetry because the entrepreneur will generally understand
the security she is selling much better than will the digital
shareholders considering buying it. This information asymmetry could be a significant hurdle for entrepreneurs to overcome, as the investors will be understandably skeptical of buying a security that is something other than common stock.
To overcome this information asymmetry, crowdfunding
entrepreneurs can accept as managerial compensation the
same security that is for sale to the crowd. By committing herself to being paid primarily with the precise security being offered, an entrepreneur can assure the crowd that the security is
worth buying. A promise of this sort to ―eat its own cooking‖
should help reduce information asymmetry and help crowdfunding function.445 It must be acknowledged, however, that
the literature on executive compensation shows how challenging it is to design an effective system.446 Even so, this technique
would appear to help crowdfunding address the fundamental
problem of information asymmetry.
This idea of securities-based compensation is novel but
closely related to the equity-based compensation used in VC
companies. What is different here is that management is compensated using the very same security sold to investors. In VC,
the investors buy convertible preferred stock and the entrepreneur is paid in straight common stock. Here, both the digital
shareholders and the entrepreneur/manager will receive the
same security, of whatever type.
442. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1482.
443. Heminway, supra note 211.
444. Here, ―safe‖ is an acronym for ―simple agreement for future equity.‖
Startup Documents, YCOMBINATOR.COM (Mar. 2015), https://www.ycombinator
.com/documents.
445. The potential tax implications for this form of compensation are beyond the scope of this Article.
446. See generally supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text.
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E. DIGITAL MONITORING
It is well known that information asymmetry and agency
costs can be reduced if the principal monitors the agent. Monitoring is used by angels (who actively participate in the business),447 VCs (who sit on the board),448 and public shareholders
(who have access to voluminous disclosure)449 to address these
problems, but these traditional methods of monitoring will not
translate to crowdfunding.450 Even if they did, these techniques
are far too costly for digital shareholders with only hundreds of
dollars at stake to use. The Internet allows for extremely inexpensive monitoring, however, meaning that digital shareholders can employ high-tech but low-cost methods to monitor the
management of the companies in which they invest.
In the analog world, most investor monitoring of management was expensive and time consuming. An investor that visited the company‘s office on a typical workday would surely
learn valuable information, such as how many hours people
spend at work, and the mere specter of such a visit would help
reduce agency costs. But flying across the country to pay a personal visit is a very costly proposition. Similarly, many public
shareholders would surely value attending a public company‘s
annual meeting, but almost none actually show up because of
the time and expense of doing so.451
In the digital world, by contrast, investor monitoring can
be accomplished at exceedingly low cost. Relevant business information, such as sales or customers, can be posted to a website in real time.452 Managers can conduct regular telepresence
meetings with investors using technologies such as Google Chat
and Apple FaceTime that allow for real-time multi-point communication. Employees could electronically clock in and out
447. See supra Part III.B.2.
448. See supra Part III.A.3.
449. See supra Part III.C.1.
450. See supra Part III.
451. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 838–39 (2013).
452. This concept goes beyond crowdfunding and may be applied to ordinary public companies. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Is Not a Crime,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2015, at A9 (―[T]his is the time to use technology to liberate information [regarding public company performance because] companies
increasingly are able to track sales, expenses and other key drivers in real
time.‖); Andy Kessler, Instead of Attacking Insider Trading, Make Everyone an
Insider, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2015, at A13 (suggesting that the SEC force public companies to ―post product sales information more often—every day or even
in real time‖).
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when they arrive and depart from their workstations and this
information could be continuously uploaded to a website available to investors or a webcam can be installed that live-streams
a view of the office to the Internet.453 Investors can use tools
like Google‘s ―Street View‖ feature to take a look around the
neighborhood, even from a thousand miles away.454 Many other
examples could be given, and new ones will be developed that
are not even conceivable at this time. The key point is that all
of these digital monitoring techniques cost next to nothing to
implement.455
The power of digital monitoring is analogous to urban bicycle-sharing programs.456 Bike sharing originated in European
cities in the 1960s.457 These early systems were free and anonymous; there was no record of who checked out which bike,
making it impossible to monitor their behavior.458 These early
systems failed because the bicycles were promptly stolen or de-

453. For example, the design firm Sagmeister & Walsh presently has a live
webcam filming the office at all times. See SAGMEISTER & WALSH, http://www
.sagmeisterwalsh.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Depending on the type of
business, however, a webcam may give a distorted view of effort, for instance if
employees spend productive hours off-site. Also, one might question whether
digital shareholders with small investments will be willing to sit and watch
hours of video streams. Experience shows, however, that people are willing to
engage in such crowdsourced activities well beyond what a strict understanding of economic rationality might suggest. See, e.g., GALAXY ZOO,
http://www.galaxyzoo.org/#/story (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (describing a
crowdsourced astronomy project involving more than 150,000 volunteers who
collectively contributed ―more than 50 million classifications [of galaxies]‖).
454. For one thing, Street View makes it difficult to pass off a vacant lot as
an operating business, as would have been possible in the pre-digital age. See,
e.g., Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 145–46 (Tex. 1931) (finding fraud by a seller who claimed that a certain lot had a ―brick dwelling
house‖ upon it when in fact it was a vacant).
455. This refers to direct costs to implement. If, for example, competitors
can use the monitoring system to wrest an advantage from the issuer, that
would clearly count as a cost of the system. However, it seems that management would be cognizant of this possibility and arrange any monitoring system so that it provides no assistance to competitors. This may limit to some
extent the utility of the monitoring system but such a trade-off must be made.
456. Bike Sharing, PEDESTRIAN & BICYCLE INFO. CTR., http://www
.pedbikeinfo.org/programs/promote_bikeshare.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015)
(―Bike sharing is an innovative transportation program, ideal for short distance point-to-point trips providing users the ability to pick up a bicycle at any
self-serve bike-station and return it to any other bike station located within
the system‘s service area.‖).
457. See Susan A. Shaheen et al., Bikesharing in Europe, the Americas, and
Asia, 2143 TRANSP. RES. REC. 159, 160 (2010).
458. Id.
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stroyed,459 as might have been expected with no way to place
responsibility for a given bike on a specific person. Even as late
as the 1990s, free and anonymous bike sharing systems were
launched in cities including Cambridge in the United Kingdom
(1993) and Boulder, Colorado (1995). In each case the systems
were cancelled due to bike theft.460
In the 2000s, however, bike-sharing has become a wellfunctioning phenomenon in many cities around the world, including Paris, New York, and Washington, D.C.461 What
changed from the 1990s to the 2000s? A revolution in information technology that allowed for effective and inexpensive
monitoring of bike-sharers. Bike-share system designers
learned from experience that ―user anonymity created a system
that was prone to bicycle theft,‖ and responded by introducing
tech-based systems that require people to swipe their personal
credit card (or electronic smartcard) to release a bike, thereby
creating a digital tether between the renter and the bike.462
This method ―records user identification information as well as
bike usage (e.g., time, duration, location, kilometers). This improvement solved previous issues of user anonymity and facilitated bicycle tracking, which reduced bicycle theft and vandalism.‖463 Thanks to this digital tracking, few bikes are lost or
damaged and the systems now work well.464 This applies directly to crowdfunding, where everything will take place on the Internet, thereby leaving a digital trail that can be easily monitored and significantly reducing agency costs.
Digital monitoring, although new and different, can be
highly effective at addressing information asymmetry and
agency costs, especially when combined with crowdsourcing.465
Consider plagiarism. In the paper era, it would be very difficult
459. Id. (recounting the history of bike sharing and describing the 1965
White Bike Plan in Amsterdam where the fifty white bikes ―were often stolen
or damaged,‖ leading the Plan to ―fail[] soon after its launch‖).
460. Id. at 160–61 (contrasting the failures of programs in Cambridge,
U.K., and Boulder, Colorado, with the rare success of a free and anonymous
system in La Rochelle, France).
461. Boulder has a well-functioning system today. See BOULDER B-CYCLE,
https://boulder.bcycle.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
462. Shaheen et al., supra note 457, at 165.
463. Id.
464. There is no indication that increased penalties or other variables deserve anywhere near as much credit as technological development. See generally id. at 165–66 (emphasizing the technological innovations that have furthered the next generation of bike-sharing systems).
465. See supra Part IV.B.
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to determine whether a given book or article was plagiarized,
as it required a careful comparison of the two hard copies. In
the digital age, by contrast, plagiarism is exceedingly easy to
detect thanks to the availability of electronic methods such as
the ―compare‖ function on Microsoft Word. This has led to
many instances these days of high-profile authors being revealed as plagiarists, including Senator John Walsh,466 scientist Jane Goodall,467 German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg,468 and Harvard undergraduate Kaavya Viswanathan,469 just to name a few.
Consider the related issue of an author who tries to pass
off a false memoir as a true account of her life. There was a
time when it was difficult to know whether a memoir was true
or false. In 1971, the book Go Ask Alice was presented as a reallife diary of a teenage girl who gets in trouble with drugs.470
Over the years, various people have questioned whether it was
a real diary, but to this day no one seems to know for sure.471 In
the Internet age, things are very different. Contrast Go Ask Alice with the 2003 book, A Million Little Pieces, presented by author James Frey as a true account of his problems with alcohol
and drugs.472 The book was endorsed by Oprah Winfrey and became a best seller. Within weeks of hitting the top of the chart,
it was debunked by online sleuths as a fabrication.473
466. See Jonathan Martin, Senator’s Thesis Turns Out To Be Remix of Others’ Works, Uncited, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at A1.
467. See Steven Levingston, Portions of Goodall’s “Seeds” Were Lifted from
Other Works, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2013, at C1.
468. See Tony Paterson, German Defence Minister Quits over PhD Plagiarism Scandal, INDEP. (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/german-defence-minister-quits-over-phd-plagiarism-scandal
-2229492.html.
469. See David Zhou, Student’s Novel Faces Plagiarism Controversy, HARV.
CRIMSON (Apr. 23, 2006), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/4/23/
students-novel-faces-plagiarism-controversy-beditors.
470. BEATRICE SPARKS, GO ASK ALICE (1971).
471. See Context, Go Ask Alice, SPARKNOTES, https://www.sparknotes.com/
lit/goaskalice/context.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (raising but not resolving
the question of authorship).
472. JAMES FREY, A MILLION LITTLE PIECES (2003).
473. See A Million Little Lies: Exposing James Frey’s Fiction Addiction,
SMOKING GUN (Jan. 8, 2006, 5:43 PM), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
documents/celebrity/million-little-lies. See generally Carol Memmott, Author’s
“Love and Consequences” Memoir Untrue, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2008, at 2D;
Neda Ulaby, “Tea” Debacle Reflects the Murky Waters of Memoirs, NPR (Apr.
19, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/04/19/135541513/tea-debacle-reflects-the
-murky-waters-of-memoirs (―[T]he noble old world of publishing has not yet
adapted to a digital age—where fact-checking is sport and results spread
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Beyond memoirs, many other examples exist of lies being
revealed as such in the Internet age. Reporter Jayson Blair
faked a number of news stories writing for the New York
Times.474 NBC News anchor Brian Williams claimed for a decade that he was in a helicopter that came under fire while on
assignment in Iraq; that story was debunked as false in 2015
after military personnel who were there raised their doubts
online.475
The point is that modern Internet sleuthing creates a very
different atmosphere than in the past when secrets stood a
much better chance of being kept quiet. Franklin D. Roosevelt
famously went his entire presidency without the American
people seeing him in a wheelchair.476 Had he lived in a digital
age, this would have been impossible. His condition would have
immediately become common knowledge simply because secrets
and lies are very hard to maintain in a digital age.
Finally, one of the strengths of digital monitoring is that it
can be amplified through crowdsourcing. Just as potential investors can crowdsource information before buying in,477 they
can also crowdsource information after they have invested.
Crowdsourced monitoring responds to the concern that each investor will lack the incentive to monitor because she has only a
small amount at stake. By sharing the burden of monitoring
among the entire crowd of digital shareholders, each person can
contribute just a bit, but the collective effort can have a powerful effect.
Crowdsourced monitoring could take place through a chatroom or website established by the company or the portal, but
that is not necessarily the case.478 Furthermore, all the same
smoking gun-style over the Internet.‖). Other examples of memoirs revealed to
be fiction in the digital era include MISHA DEFONSECA, MISHA: A MEMOIR OF
THE HOLOCAUST YEARS (1997), MARGARET B. JONES, LOVE AND CONSEQUENCES (2008), NORMA KHOURI, HONOR LOST: LOVE AND DEATH IN MODERN-DAY
JORDAN (2003), and DAVID OLIVER RELIN & GREG MORTENSON, THREE CUPS
OF TEA (2006). Memmott, supra.
474. See Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at A1.
475. See Joe Flint, NBC News Anchor Williams Draws Criticism for False
Tale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B2. Williams was subsequently suspended
for six months. Joe Flint, NBC Suspends “Nightly News” Anchor Brian Williams for Six Months, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2015, at A1.
476. See HUGH G. GALLAGHER, FDR‘S SPLENDID DECEPTION 88–105, 207–
16 (1985).
477. See supra Part IV.B.
478. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,530 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
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arguments discussed in Part IV.B above apply here, but even
more so because investors have rights to additional information. For example, shareholders have the authority to request books and records from the corporation for any proper
purpose.479 Hence, even if a company would prefer not to share
information with the crowdfund investors, it may be forced to
do so by a books-and-records request.480 A group of people
working together and sharing information via an online chat
group, especially armed with the power to demand books and
records, can be a powerful force to ameliorate information
asymmetry and agency costs in the crowdfunding context.
In summary, digital monitoring will be a powerful means
of addressing information asymmetry and especially agency
costs in crowdfunding.
CONCLUSION
This Article claims that crowdfunding can overcome the
three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance and
succeed using digital methods that are different from those
used by VCs, angel investors, or public companies. In doing so,
it makes at least three novel contributions to the crowdfunding
literature and corporate and securities law more generally.
First, it describes the distinctive way in which the three fundamental problems of finance will express themselves in crowdfunding‘s unique context.481 Second, it reviews the significant
solutions to the trio of problems employed in the analogous contexts of VC, angel investing, and public companies, and determines their relevance for crowdfunding.482 Third, it introduces
a set of new and promising digital methods to address the trio
of problems in crowdfunding.483 The next step is simply to wait
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–240, 249) (recognizing that investors may participate
in additional discussions on external websites).
479. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)(1)–(2) (2011) (―Any stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, . . . shall . . . have the right . . . to
inspect . . . the corporation‘s stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records.‖); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 13:3 (3d ed. 2011) (―A shareholder has a common
law right to inspect corporate books and records, in person or by agent, for a
proper purpose in order to protect the shareholder‘s interest.‖).
480. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1484–86 (suggesting that the costs associated with the shareholder right to demand books and records is a reason
for companies to refrain from selling common stock via crowdfunding).
481. See supra Part II.
482. See supra Part III.
483. See supra Part IV.
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and see what happens once the SEC finishes its work and
crowdfunding commences.

